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Deregulation and the successful introduction of competition to the market
for telephone services raise the complex issue of interconnection. Incumbent
telephone companies have an incentive to maximize profits by charging entrants
the highest interconnection price possible. In New Zealand, the debate over
the proper terms of interconnection was brought before the courts under the
country's antitrust laws. The incumbent attempted to establish "the parity
principle" as the standard for interconnection. As proposed in New Zealand,
the parity principle would allow an unregulated monopolist to set access
charges at a level sufficient to compensate it for the financial consequences of
entry. Justification for this standard lies in claims that any other
interconnection rule would be inefficient. Tye and Lapuerta critique these
efficiency claims. They argue that the proposed rule would frustrate goals of
competition, including: constraining monopoly pricing, enhancing dynamic
efficiency and encouraging technological progress. The authors reject the parity
principle in favor of a proposal that compensates rival networks for terminating
inter-network calls on the basis of long-run incremental cost. They explain how
interconnection on these terms can simultaneously promote successful
competition and efficiency in the provision of telephone service.
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Introduction
Deregulation of telecommunications is inspired by the belief that
competition will prevent monopolistic behavior more efficiently than direct
price regulation by the government. Compared to regulation, competition offers
consumers the dynamic benefits of increased efficiency and technological
progress. The New Zealand government was motivated by this vision when
it recently privatized the national telecommunications company, Telecom of
New Zealand ("Telecom"). Clear Communications ("Clear") promptly
proposed to compete with Telecom in the provision of local telephone service.
Both companies required an interconnection agreement so that the calls
originating on either network could be terminated on the other. Their dispute
over the appropriate terms of interconnection was litigated under the antitrust
laws of New Zealand. The economic debate between Clear and Telecom
encompassed issues of efficiency, successful competition, and technological
progress. The current trend towards telecommunications deregulation in the
United States and other nations renders the New Zealand experience an
interesting preview of issues that are likely to arise elsewhere.
Telecom of New Zealand proposed "the parity principle" as the standard
for its interconnection proposals. Telecom argued that an unregulated
monopolist should be permitted to set access charges at a level sufficient to
compensate it for the financial consequences of entry. Justification for this
standard lay in claims that any other interconnection rule would be inefficient.'
Although these efficiency claims have some application to regulated markets,
they are not valid in a deregulated, competitive environment. Telecom also
claimed that the parity principle was efficient because it would subsidize a
Universal Service Obligation ("USO") unique to Telecom. Apart from the
debate over the existence of such a burden, any USO costs can be recovered
in a competitively neutral manner without altering the terms of interconnection.
We show that the parity principle as proposed in New Zealand is not
unique in achieving "weak competitive neutrality," defined as competition on
the basis of true efficiency differences. An interconnection regime achieves
weak competitive neutrality if incumbent status confers neither an advantage
nor a disadvantage with respect to prospective competition. Other
interconnection rules also achieve the same weak competitive neutrality as long
1. William J. Baumol & Robert D. Willig, Brief of Evidence: Economic Principles for
Evaluation of the Issues Raised by Clear Communications Ltd. on Interconnection with Telecom
Corporation of New Zealand Ltd., Telecom Corp. of N.Z. v. Clear Communications Ltd., [1992]
5 T.C.L.R. 166 (H.C.); see also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD
COMPETITION IN LOCAL TELEPHONY (1994). The parity principle is based on the theory of
.contestable markets." The theory assumes frictionless entry and exit. See William J. Baumol,
Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1
(1982).
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as the final price of telecommunication services is not fixed by regulation.
Moreover, the parity principle fails to achieve what we define as "strong
competitive neutrality." Strong competitive neutrality requires that the price
of interconnection not perpetuate monopoly rents,2 that the incumbent be
compensated for any legacies of regulation, and that equally efficient
competitors have the same opportunity to expect3 to earn their cost of capital.
The parity principle fails this test because it renders competition ineffective
in reducing the monopoly rents of the incumbent. Compensating the monopolist
for the financial consequences of entry only leaves consumer prices at
monopolistic levels.
The incumbent monopolist and entrant do not compete on "a level playing
field" under the parity principle, because the entrant is condemned to
inadequate recovery of its sunk4 and common5 costs. The rule threatens to
impede technological progress by constraining the entrant to indemnify
incumbents for all sunk costs (even of obsolete technology) and by creating
a mechanism whereby incumbents can appropriate the efficiency gains and
benefits of innovation by entrants. The parity principle is inspired by the belief
that voluntary negotiations can yield efficient prices. In reality, voluntary
negotiations open the door to opportunistic behavior by the incumbent.
We propose an alternative approach to the interconnection of
telecommunications networks that satisfies strong competitive neutrality. We
describe how the incumbent can be compensated for any prior legacies of
regulation or for any unique USO burden in a competitively neutral manner.
Our proposed regime compensates rival networks for the cost of terminating
2. Obviously, this test would not deny the bottleneck carrier the benefits of a competitive
rate of profit from ownership of the bottleneck.
3. "Expectation" does not guarantee that the cost of capital will be earned. Confusion
arises if one applies common dictionary meanings of "expected": "to look for as likely to occur
or appear" or "to look for as due, proper, or necessary." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY
492 (2d ed. 1982). We invoke the statistical meaning of expecting to earn the cost of capital. See
WILLIAM L. HAYES & ROBERT L. WINKLER, STATISTICS 152 (1981) ("[E]xpected value originally
meant the expected long-run winnings (or losings) over repeated play; this term has been retained
in mathematical statistics to mean the long-run average value for any random variable over an
indefinite number of samplings.").
4. "Sunk costs.., are costs that (in some short or intermediate run) cannot be eliminated,
even by total cessation of production." WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS
AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 280 (1982).
5. Common costs arise when several services can be provided simultaneously for less than
it would cost to provide each service separately. The "stand-alone" cost is the cost of providing
each service separately. The "incremental" cost of a particular service is the cost of providing
the combined package minus the "stand-alone" cost of the other services. When it is more efficient
to provide both services together rather than separately, the incremental costs of each service do





inter-network calls on the basis of long-run incremental cost.6 We describe
how our approach can foster effective competition that satisfies strong
competitive neutrality.
Part I of this essay introduces the theory of the parity principle as
proposed in New Zealand, including the claims that alternative pricing rules
would be inefficient. Part II provides a detailed critique of these efficiency
claims as well as other problems with the rule. Part III analyzes the history
of the litigation between Clear and Telecom and the interconnection debate in
New Zealand. It describes the claims made by academic proponents of the
parity principle in New Zealand, the errors of the Courts in evaluating the
rule, and the eventual resolution of the dispute. Part IV discusses our proposal
for compensating rival networks for terminating internetwork calls on the basis
of long-run incremental cost. Part V summarizes our conclusions.
I. The Theory of the Parity Principle
Figure 1 illustrates the theory of the parity principle.7 The example is
drawn from Baumol & Sidak in their Yale Journal On Regulation article,
where they claim that pricing interconnection in telecommunications is no
different than pricing access for railroads. That article involves a railroad that
owns the bottleneck portion of a route and that also participates in the
competitive portion of a connecting route (sometimes called the "contested
area"'). The controlling railroad determines the bottleneck price by taking the
full price over the entire route and subtracting its incremental costs over the
competitive portion. Specifically, the carrier owning the bottleneck can receive
a price of $10 over the entire route and faces "direct" incremental costs of $3
over the competitive portion.9 Under the parity principle, these assumptions
yield a price of $7 for the bottleneck. If a new entrant can pay $7 for access
to the bottleneck portion and charge less than $10 for the entire route, it is
only because the new entrant has incremental costs of less than $3 over the
competitive portion and is therefore more efficient. Ergo, it is argued that the
6. "Incremental" costs must be incurred to expand output by specified increments. See
William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11 YALE J.
ON REG. 171, 176 (1994) ("Incremental cost is a generic concept referring to the addition, per
unit of the additional output in question, to the firm's total cost when the output of X expands by
some preselected increment."). We take "incremental" costs to be synonymous with call "direct"
incremental cost, excluding "opportunity cost." Id. at 178.
7. We assume away all the other problems in implementing the parity principle by simply
taking the assumptions in the hypothetical as true. We do not believe that simple railroad models
correctly characterize the telecommunications industry.
8. This example was cited in all three New Zealand decisions in Telecom Corp. of N.Z.
v. Clear Communications, Ltd., [1992] 5 T.C.L.R. 166 (H.C.), rev'd, [1993] 4 N.Z.B.L.C. 340
(C.A.), rev'd, [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385 (P.C.).
9. Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 185-86.
Copyright © 1996 by the Yale Journal on Regulation
The Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 13:419, 1996
FIGURE 1
Applying the Parity Principle to the Railroad Industry
Price over entire route = $10.00






Price for Bottleneck Portion?
" Parity principle price: $ 7.00
" Lower "regulated" price: $ 5.50
Net Revenues Available to Entrant
Over Competitive Portion
$10.00 - $7.00 = $3.00
$10.00 - $5.50 = $4.50
Source:
Bautmol & Sidak, "The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors" 11 Yale Journal On
Regulation No. 1 (Winter 1994), 171.
* Baumol and Sidak do not treat carrier "B" as a proposed entrant. "B" is here
designated as an entrant for direct analogy to Clear's position v. Telecom.
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parity principle is a necessary condition for economic efficiency.
If the price for the bottleneck portion were set below the parity principle
price, at say $5.50, Baumol and Sidak claim that a new entrant might be able
to turn a profit even if its incremental costs are higher than those of the
bottleneck carrier.'" Ergo, prices lower than the parity principle produce
inefficiency.
The parity principle price requires that the bottleneck carrier be
indifferent between handling all the business itself and cooperating with the
connecting carrier at the $10 final price to the customer. Handling the business
itself, the bottleneck carrier receives $10 over the entire route and incurs $3
in "direct" incremental costs over the competitive portion, leaving a total of
$7 remaining to cover the costs of the bottleneck. Put differently, the
monopolist earns a "contribution" of ($10-3-3=) $4 when it provides the
service itself if its "direct" incremental costs on both route segments are $3.
This contribution is labelled the "opportunity cost" of providing access. The
$7 price of access may be thought of as the sum of the "opportunity cost" ($4)
and the "direct" incremental cost ($3).
By cooperating with the connecting carrier at the parity principle price,
it receives the same $7 to cover the costs of the bottleneck - its "direct"
incremental costs over the competitive portion are avoided altogether. The
bottleneck owner is therefore no worse off cooperating with the connecting
carrier." The appeal of the parity principle stems largely from the
indifference of the bottleneck carrier over routing decisions at this "efficient"
price. Proponents of the parity principle conclude from similar illustrations that
no regulatory intervention is necessary to set the terms of access.
More recently, Baumol, Ordover, and Willig purport to show with a
formal mathematical proof that the parity principle is both a necessary and
sufficient condition for a level playing field for the incumbent and entrant.'
2
In the telecommunications context, the "local loop" is the bottleneck
facility, the incumbent is the firm owning the facility over which access is
sought, and the entrant is the firm seeking access. The entrant requires access
to the local loop to ensure that its customers can place calls with and receive
calls from members of the incumbent network. This ubiquity is essential to
successful competition. Once an entrant acquires customers, the incumbent also
requires access to the entrant's network in order to preserve ubiquity.
10. Id. at 186.
11. Figure 1 relabels the connecting carrier as a "proposed entrant" for direct analogy to
Clear, but the label does not affect illustration of the rule.
12. William J. Baumol et al., Parity Pricing and Its Critics: Necessary Conditions for
Efficiency in Provision of Bottleneck Services to Competitors 11-13 (Jan. 1996) (manuscript on
file with Yale Journal on Regulation). A revised version of the manuscript will appear in 14 YALE
J. ON REG. (forthcoming Dec. 1996).
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However, the parity principle does not apply a symmetrical pricing scheme
for access to each network. When a call originates on the incumbent's network
and terminates in the entrant's, the parity principle grants the entrant the
incremental cost savings of the incumbent from not having to terminate the
call. The analogy to Figure 1 would involve the bottleneck carrier hiring the
entrant to carry the traffic over the competitive portion of the route for $3.
When a call originates on the entrant's network and terminates in the
incumbent's, the incumbent does not receive the same $3. Rather, the parity
principle grants the incumbent an amount analogous to the $7 access price in
Figure 1.
The incumbent is supposed to determine the business it might lose as a
result of interconnection and charge the entrant for the consequent loss of net
revenues, defined as the incumbent's "incremental revenue minus the
incremental costs that this foregone sale would otherwise have brought to [the
incumbent]."' 3 The rule has been characterized as a cost rule by labelling
Telecom's foregone net revenues in the calculation as "opportunity costs."14
The rule is explicitly designed to leave Telecom financially indifferent to the
prospect of losing business to Clear."
Proponents of the parity principle have made different policy
recommendations in different contexts, generating confusion as to exactly what
the rule entails. In the United States railroad industry, for example, the parity
principle has been invoked to support complete deregulation of access prices
by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Proponents of the parity principle
urged a reliance on voluntary negotiations between the bottleneck and
connecting carriers. In the United States telecommunications industry, the
parity principle has been invoked to support regulated increases in the retail
price. Given an access price of $8 in Figure 1, for example, the parity
principle has been invoked in proposals to increase the incumbent's retail price
to $11. In the New Zealand debates, the parity principle was proposed as the
13. Baumol & Willig, supra note 1, at 23.
14. Baumol and Sidak describe the rule thus:
Opportunity cost refers to all potential earnings that the supplying firm forgoes,
either by providing inputs of its own rather than purchasing them, or by offering
services to competitors that force it to relinquish business to those rivals, and thus
to forgo the profits on that lost business .... The efficient component-pricing rule
states simply that the price of an input should equal its average-incremental cost,
including all pertinent incremental opportunity costs.
Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 178.
15. As Baumol and Sidak explain:
[Tjhe landlord is said to have chosen to "buy" rather than "make" the B-to-C
transportation component of the final product .... [T]he efficient component-pricing
rule achieves the principle of indifference .... [T]he landlord is indifferent as to
whether that particular transportation service is provided by itself or a rival.




standard for judging whether Telecom's access price proposals violated the
New Zealand antitrust laws. Unless we specify differently, we will refer to
the specific variant of the rule proposed for New Zealand when discussing the
parity principle - in particular, the calculation of "opportunity cost" by using
the incumbent's existing retail rates, unconstrained by regulation.
The parity principle has been illustrated and recommended largely by the
use of hypothetical interconnection examples drawn from the railroad industry.
Railroad interconnection problems, however, provide a poor analogy to the
New Zealand telecommunications industry. These examples ignore the role of
technological progress in telecommunications. The railroad examples invariably
involve one firm controlling an essential route and another firm that simply
replicates the service offered over a connecting route. A new service is not
contemplated. In fact, the public policy concerns in the United States rail
industry's transition to deregulation were excess capacity and efficient exit
from the industry rather than the entry of new firms. In New Zealand, Clear
did not simply propose to replicate the existing service or technology that
Telecom offered over existing routes. Rather, it proposed new services and
technologies. These aspects of competitive entry must be recognized in
determining optimal terms for interconnection.
Hypothetical examples from the rail industry also ignore the reciprocity
involved in telecommunications, because the telecommunications entrant never
controls an essential route itself. The railroad examples therefore reinforce the
narrow view of entrants as simply large PABX customers. Rather, if an entrant
introduces an independent network, it should be acknowledged in determining
the optimal pricing rules for interconnection. Interconnection necessarily
involves reciprocity because the incumbent requires access to the entrant's
network in order to preserve ubiquity. 6
II. The Parity Principle Should Not be the Standard for the Interconnection
Proposals of an Unregulated Local Exchange Carrier
A. The Parity Principle Perpetuates Monopoly Profits
After considerable initial confusion based on testimony before the Courts,
experts in the New Zealand debate now agree: " the parity principle alone
16. "It would be essential for Clear to make use of Telecom's basic existing network, so
that Clear customers could call Telecom's customers and vice versa; 'ubiquity' is acknowledged
to be essential to any such service." Telecom Corp. of N.Z. v. Clear Communications, Ltd.,
[1993] 4 N.Z.L.R. 340, 342 (C.A.).
17. Baumol and Sidak sympathized with the Court of Appeal's rejection of the rule
precisely because of the monopoly rents problem: "It is therefore understandable that the Court
of Appeal ordered Clear and Telecom to renew negotiations to set an access price that excluded
any monopoly profit foregone by Telecom." Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 195 (emphasis
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cannot approximate the results of a competitive market in New Zealand,
precisely because it indemnifies the bottleneck carrier from the financial
consequences of competition."8 In an environment such as New Zealand
(monopoly power without any effective price regulation), the parity principle
instead perpetuates monopoly results.' 9 If, in Figure 1, for example, the $10
final price is a monopoly price, the parity principle does not allow an equally
efficient entrant to bring it down to competitive levels. Forced to pay an access
price of $7, the entrant can only survive by charging the same monopoly price
as the incumbent. More generally, any rule leaving the monopolist indifferent
to competition will fail to impose the full discipline of competition on that
monopolist.2' Any firm enjoying monopoly rents21 before the operation of
added). To add to the confusion, Baumol and Sidak subsequently appeared to support the reasoning
of the Privy Council in rejecting the Court of Appeal decision with which they had previously
seemed to justify. William T. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to
Competitors: Rejoinder and Epilogue, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 177, 179-85 (1995).
More recent testimony by Professor Baumol represents an even more dramatic statement
of the limitations of the rule as proposed for New Zealand. Proceeding on Motion of the
Commission to Investigate Performance-Based Incentive Regulatory Plans for New York Telephone
Company (Track 2) Case 92-C-0665 (direct testimony of William J. Baumol before the State of
New York Public Service Commission on behalf of AT&T) (1994) [hereinafter Baumol AT&T
Testimony].
18. Baumol and Sidak explicitly concede this:
Suppose that, in the absence of the tenant, the landlord has monopoly power in the
final-product market and earns a high rate of profit on sales. If, by supplying the
input to the tenant, the landlord permits the tenant to take away some of those
profitable sales, then the monopoly profit on those forgone final-product sales is
indeed an opportunity cost to the landlord. According to the efficient component-
pricing rule, the tenant should be required to compensate the landlord for that loss.
This ensures the monopoly earnings of the landlord. It also undercuts the tenant's
power to introduce effective competition into the final-product market and, thereby,
its ability to reduce prices to their competitive levels.
Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 195.
19. Professor Kahn makes the same point:
Unsurprisingly, therefore, opponents of interconnection charges proposed by
telephone companies, including Justice Gault, of the New Zealand Court of Appeal,
protest that the entitlement claimed by the LECs to recover the "opportunity costs"
of business lost to competitors is merely a rationalization for the continued collection
of monopoly profits. They are right, it could well be.
Alfred E. Kahn & William E. Taylor, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors: A Comment,
11 YALE J. ON REG. 225, 231 (1994) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
20. The Court of Appeal described the High Court's reasoning as "self-evident" that the
parity principle would preserve monopoly rents. Telecom Corp. of N.Z. v. Clear Communications,
Ltd., [1993] 4 N.Z.B.L.C. 340, 343 (C.A.), rev'd, [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385 (P.C.). The court
observed:
[T]he rule would seem obviously anti-competitive ... It would amount to allowing
a new entry into a market on condition only that the competitor indemnify the
monopolist against any loss of custom. That would be at once an unreasonable use
of monopoly power, a restriction on entry, and a prevention or deterrence of
competitive conduct. . . . [lit seems to me that a substantial purpose of the
monopolist in laying down such a condition is to restrict competition so as to
preserve its own position as far as possible.
Vol. 13:419, 1996
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the rule will continue to do so afterwards.
Professors Baumol and Willig clearly stated at trial that pricing
interconnection at levels dictated by the parity principle would not prevent
Telecom from continuing to earn monopoly rents, if they existed:
[T]he rule is not designed to remedy any shortcomings, should they
exist, elsewhere in the enterprise in question.
.. [E]fficient component pricing does not, and is not
designed to, cure mispricing of any other items handled by the firm
in question. For example, the rule on the pricing of components
cannot be used to deal with any overpricing of final product that
is alleged to be present. Any problems in such domains should be
attacked with different tools suitable to their own tasks.2 2
Despite such warnings, the Courts nevertheless affirmed Telecom's use
of the parity principle, even though it would "cement in" Telecom's market
power.23 A key reason was that the testimony of Baumol and Willig
vigorously rejected proposals to fix the problem of inflated access prices by
purging them of monopoly profits or any other deficiencies. In their brief to
the High Court, Baumol and Willig strongly advised against any attempt to set
an access price below the parity principle price, even in the presence of
monopoly rents.24 They attempted to shift the responsibility for monopoly
rents away from the parity principle; Professors Baumol and Willig
recommended that monopoly rents only be handled by regulating the end price
Id.
21. Monopoly rents indicate "inefficiencies" and "profits in excess of what would represent
a reasonable return (including reasonable profit) on capital invested" Telecom Corp. of N.Z. v.
Clear Communications, Ltd., [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385, 395-96 (P.C.).
22. Baumol & Willig, supra note 1, at 35, 37.
23. [1993] 4 N.Z.B.L.C. at 356 (Gault, J., concurring).
24. Baumol and Willig asserted that the result of charging prices below the parity principle
would "inevitably ... creat[e] new inefficiencies and new distorted incentives that harm
consumers and the public interest." Baumol & Willig, supra note 1, at 37 (emphasis added).
Because of the subsequent statements of the participants, there may be some confusion as to how
this matter stood at trial. Thus, statements by Telecom's attorney seem relevant:
However, if such [monopoly] rents were present in Telecom's retail price Professor
Baumol and Dr[.] Kahn both accepted that the implementation of the pricing rule
would allow Telecom to continue to recover them .... Both said, however, that
the rule should not be manipulated in an attempt to deal with monopoly rents as that
would cause other significant inefficiencies, for example, uneconomic bypass. Both
acknowledged that if monopoly rents were perceived to be a problem the proper
mechanism to deal with them was through some form of price cap on Telecom 'sfinal
prices.
Terence Arnold, The Courts, The Commerce Act, and the Pricing of Access to Essential Facilities:
Law and Economics at Work?, Address before Law and Economics Association of New Zealand
41 (Dec. 5, 1994) (emphasis added).
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of the services involved. However, there was no regulation of the consumer
price for telecommunications services in New Zealand. This raises several
questions: Why should regulators refrain from purging the interconnection
price of monopoly rents? What is peculiar about this task that it must only be
accomplished through regulation of the final price? And where are the
regulators of the final price? The parity principle is even less defensible in a
deregulated environment where the government has shown it prefers not to
regulate the final price. If the parity principle is inappropriate, the answer is
to abandon it, not blame some non-existent regulator. Setting prices based on
the parity principle in New Zealand would instead perpetuate inefficient25
monopoly pricing by Telecom.
Professor Kahn also supported the parity principle before the New
Zealand Courts26 and, like Professor Baumol, has since published statements
sympathizing with the Court of Appeal's rejection of the rule as applied in
New Zealand because of the monopoly rents problem.27
Part of the confusion in the New Zealand debate arises from suggestions
that a hypothetically more efficient entrant could still compete away the
incumbent's monopoly profits under the parity principle.2" However, this can
not happen under the parity principle as proposed for New Zealand. Even a
more efficient entrant would not be successful in lowering the final price. An
entrant's superior efficiency will simply tempt the incumbent to raise the access
price.
Figure 2 illustrates the incentive of the bottleneck carrier to appropriate
the efficiency advantages of the entrant in a price squeeze.29 It assumes the
entrant has an efficiency advantage of $1 relative to the incumbent over the
competitive portion of the route. If the bottleneck price is $7, the entrant
25. Monopoly prices yield allocative inefficiency by inhibiting consumption relative to the
competitive level. For a discussion of the inefficiency of monopoly prices, see JEAN TIROLE, THE
THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 64-68 (1988).
26. Alfred Kahn, Brief of Evidence: An Economic Evaluation of the Issues Relating to
the Terms of Interconnection Provided to Clear Communications by Telecom New Zealand at 30,
Telecom Corp. of N.Z. v. Clear Communications Ltd., [1992] 5 T.C.L.R. 166 (H.C.), rev'd,
[1993] 4 N.Z.B.L.C. 340 (C.A.), rev'd, [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385 (P.C.).
27. "Although efficient component pricing will ensure the retailing function (subject to
competition) is performed by the most efficient of the rivals, it will not in itself achieve the other
important function of competition-the erosion of monopoly profits." Alfred Kahn, Opening up
Utilities, ECONOMIST, Dec. 25, 1993-Jan. 7, 1994, at 6.
28. Baumol & Willig, supra note 1, at 37. Earlier they write:
[I]t should be noted that efficient component prices ensure that any excesses in the
incumbent's costs of completing the final product will be a magnet for profitable
entry. . . . [E]fficient component pricing provides both a competitive spur to the
incumbent's efficiency, and a solution to any such inefficiency that nevertheless
persists.
Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
29. Again, we assume away all the other problems in implementing the parity principle




maintains the "fruit" of its efficiency gain: it collects $10 for the route, pays
$7 for the bottleneck, incurs $2 in incremental costs and retains a profit of $1.
Perhaps even consumers could hope to gain from entry if the price is cut to
$9.
However, the entrant's efficiency gain leaves the bottleneck carrier room
to increase profits by raising the price of access beyond the $7 price to almost
$8. The profits available to the entrant are reduced to the "peppercorn"
necessary to preserve its incentive to enter. The entrant sacrifices most of its
efficiency gains to the bottleneck carrier.
This price squeeze would not result in a regime of true competition. In
competitive markets, firms retain the benefits of their efficiency gains until
competitors are able to match them. However, the ability to implement a price
squeeze opens the possibility of appropriating efficiency gains. The new
entrant's incentives for efficiency are therefore reduced compared to the typical
competitive situation.
Proponents of the parity principle may claim that the consumer failed to
get the benefits of competition over the competitive portion (or the entrant
failed to realize the benefits of its efficiency gain) precisely because the
monopolist charged a price for the bottleneck higher than the $7 ostensibly
dictated by the parity principle.30 There are two problems with this response.
First, as explained in more detail below, proponents of the parity principle
have previously supported charging the higher price for access to permit the
monopolist to capture the entrant's efficiency gains under their theory of
"voluntary negotiations." Second, access prices that appropriate the entrant's
efficiency gains can be characterized as meeting the test of the parity principle.
The bottleneck monopolist could use the "imputation rule" sometimes proposed
in connection with the parity principle31 to say that the presence of
30. Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 189 n. 14. Baumol and Sidak state that this property
of the parity principle refutes the demonstration of a "perfect price squeeze" in WILLIAM B. TYE,
THE THEORY OF CONTESTABLE MARKETS: APPLICATIONS TO REGULATORY AND ANTITRUST
PROBLEMS IN THE RAIL INDUSTRY 65-69 (1990). However, a careful reading of this passage
clearly indicates that Tye is addressing the properties of the "voluntary negotiations" model
recommended by Professors Baumol and Willig for the rail industry. Figure 2 illustrates that
voluntary negotiations will indeed permit the bottleneck owner to appropriate the entrant's
efficiency gains. Indeed, that appropriation is the only incentive for voluntary negotiations by
the monopolist.
31. The "imputation rule" has been proposed in regulatory circles to support an increase
in the "opportunity cost" so that the incumbent can absorb the new entrant's efficiency gains.
Baumol and Sidak reason that:
[T]he analysis underlying the rule indicates how the LEC should price the final
product, intraLATA toll service, when selling that product to consumers .... Thus,
the sale of the final product by the LEC entails a forgone access profit. The
magnitude of this forgone profit, or opportunity cost, is determined by the price of
the sale of access to the IXC, as governed by the efficient component-pricing rule.
Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 198.
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FIGURE 2
The Bottleneck Carrier Has an Incentive to Appropriate
the Entrant's Efficiency Gains
Price over entire mute = $10.00






Baumol and Sidak's Example
" Parity principle price = $7
* Revenues available to entrant over competitive portion: $10-$7 = $3
* Profit to efficient entrant: $3-$2 = $1
Bottleneck Carrier Implements Price Squeeze
* Bottleneck price = $(8-6)
* Revenues available to entrant over competitive portion: $10-$(8-A) = $(2+ )
" Profit to efficient entrant= $A
b Reduced incentive to entrant for efficiency gains
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competitors willing to supply the competitive service at $2 has increased the
"opportunity cost" of access to $8. Using the logic of this "imputation rule,"
the owner of the bottleneck incurs an opportunity cost of $8 after the entry of
a more efficient competitor, because that is the "forgone access profit." Added
to the bottleneck carrier's incremental cost, the owner of the facility uses the
$8 opportunity cost to raise its price to the customer to $11. It does not cut
the price to $9.32 The parity principle cannot distinguish between
combinations of access prices and end prices that leave the same margin for
the competitive service. In Figure 1, the combination of a $7 access price and
a $10 end price is indistinguishable from the combination of $8 and $11 that
appropriates the entrant's efficiency gains. Both satisfy the parity principle.
When the incumbent raises the access price to $8 and the final price to $11,
it simultaneously maximizes profits and channels the traffic to the more
efficient entrant. The parity principle would appear to be working, but the
entrant's efficiency gains have been appropriated by the incumbent and the $10
monopoly price to customers is perpetuated.
Many proponents of the parity principle firmly believe that the problem
of granting competitive access ought to be left to the discretion of the
bottleneck carrier.33 The parity principle appeals as a solution because its
proponents believe that it is the price that would result from "voluntary
negotiations. "" However, voluntary negotiations do not permit the entrant
to retain its efficiency gains, nor is an unregulated monopolist motivated to
charge the competitive price of access.
And what if voluntary negotiations fail? The fault, according to the
theory, lies with alleged obstinacy on the part of the entrant.35 Professors
32. Interestingly, proponents of the parity principle advocate requiring an incumbent to
raise the end price to restore the margin over the price of the component that is mandated by this
"imputation rule." See Proceeding on AT&T's Petition to Establish Conditions Necessary to Permit
Effective Exchange Competition to the Extent Feasible 15-17 (testimony of Robert D. Willig before
the State of Illinois Public Service Commission on behalf of AT&T Communications of Illinois)
(1994) [hereinafter Willig Testimony].
33. Supporters of the parity principle argue that any price for access less than what the
carrier would voluntarily agree to would represent an anticompetitive cross subsidy. See William
B. Tye, Pricing Trackage Rights to Preserve Post-Merger Rail Competition on Equal Terms, 24
LOGISTICS &TRANSP. REv. 317 (1988); William B. Tye, Preserving Postmerger Rail Competition
via the Parity Principle, 26 TRANSP. J. 39 (1986) [hereinafter Rail Competition]. Professor Baumol
has argued against government intervention in disputes over access to bottleneck facilities. He
predicts voluntary negotiations will lead to use of the more efficient carrier. Verified Statement
of William J. Baumol, Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Burlington N.R.R., No. 40224, 1991 WL
219374 (I.C.C. Oct. 29, 1991) (brief filed Apr. 27, 1991) (dismissing action with prejudice).
Support for voluntary negotiations is difficult to reconcile with statements in Baumol and Sidak
that appear to support regulatory intervention. See Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 174.
34. See generally Verified Statement of William J. Baumol & Robert Willig, In re
Seaboard Airline R.R., No. 21215 (I.C.C. 1993) [hereinafter Seaboard Testimony].
35. In Seaboard Testimony, Professor Willig suggests that any failure of the "voluntary
negotiations" model is always the fault of the connecting carrier. Id. at 44. He states, for instance,
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Baumol and Willig's hypothetical examples assume the bottleneck owner will
restrain itself from appropriating efficiency gains by entrants. Baumol and
Sidak argue that the parity principle price "gives the tenant all the fruits of
whatever superiority in efficiency it may provide" as indicated by their
mathematical equation.36 However, that claim is inconsistent with the claim
that voluntary negotiations will yield the economically efficient price.37 The
bottleneck owner is highly motivated in a regime of voluntary negotiations to
raise the access price and execute a perfect price squeeze.3"
Perhaps the most compelling argument against the assertion that
monopolists will voluntarily adopt the parity principle is Telecom's own
behavior. Telecom did not independently seek to implement the parity principle
in this case. The Courts ruled that the parity principle was a novelty imported
from Professor Baumol under threat of litigation.39 The Courts also ruled that
Telecom sought to impose onerous non-price terms of interconnection to the
essential facility that could not be justified in terms of cost.4"
that the model would fail "only from a mistake in the pricing of Railroad B's [the connecting
railroad seeking access in the example] services." Id. at 45.
36. Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 187.
37. Transaction costs pose another complication to the voluntary negotiations theory. A
bottleneck owner will only be motivated to implement the parity principle if the efficiency gains
it can capture from the prospective entrant offset the transaction costs of negotiation and
cooperation. Transaction costs can tip the scale in favor of foreclosure. The bottleneck owner will
prefer foreclosure unless it can offset such costs by exceeding Professor Baumol's parity principle
price. If the transaction costs themselves exceed the efficiency advantage of the entrant, foreclosure
is guaranteed.
Proponents of voluntary negotiations proclaim the efficiency of this outcome by viewing
transaction costs as incremental costs. See, e.g., Baumol & Willig, supra note 1, at 25-26.
However, this ignores the possibility that choosing rules for access to the bottleneck may change
transaction costs. In particular, transaction costs may be significantly reduced by clear rules
encouraging access.
38. Baumol and Sidak's equations show the entrant can earn an additional profit equal to
its efficiency gains if the parity principle is followed (and there are no sunk costs). The entrant
earns N(AICx - AICy), which represents the entrant's share of traffic times the difference between
the entrant's and the incumbent's incremental costs. Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 189,
Equation 7. However, the bottleneck owner can exceed the parity principle price and reduce the
entrant's profits to a "peppercorn." The bottleneck owner's profits of T can be increased to T +
N(AICx - AICr - A). Id. at 187, Equation 4. Here A represents the "peppercorn" necessary to
induce the entrant to continue operations. The price that accomplishes this transfer of profit to
the bottleneck carrier is not the parity principle price:
parity principle price = (AC) + TIM.
Rather, the "perfect price squeeze" price is:
AIC + TIM + (AICx - AIC, - A).
Id.
39. The Privy Council determined that "[tihe Baumol-Willig Rule ... is not a general
rule of economic thinking but was coined for the purposes of this case because it was propounded
by Professors Baumol and Willig." Telecom Corp. of N.Z. v. Clear Communications, Ltd., [1995]
1 N.Z.L.R. 385, 394 (P.C.).
40. The Privy Council found that "the terms for interconnection set by Telecom in their
proposal of 7th August 1991 as varied down to the date of trial contravened s[ection] 36," id. at




Arguments that competition will purge the price of monopoly rents ignore
the fact that the monopolist has every incentive to maximize the value of the
bottleneck. Even if the monopolist allows competitive access to drive down
costs, the monopolist has no incentive to allow a decreased price for the final
good relative to the previous profit-maximizing level. If we are to rely on a
hypothetically more efficient entrant to compete away monopoly rents,
additional constraints or "complementary" rules regulating the incumbent's
behavior are required.4 The parity principle alone will not work.
B. The Parity Principle is Neither Necessary Nor Sufficient for Economic
Efficiency
Professors Baumol and Willig claim that the parity principle is necessary
for economic efficiency.42 They label any lower price as an "inter-firm cross-
subsidy to the entrant."43 Baumol and Sidak claim that the parity principle
is "a necessary condition for economic efficiency, and hence for promoting
the public interest. That is, product-component prices that do not follow this
principle create an incentive for inefficiency whose costs consumers have to
pay."' Consistent with their claims of efficiency, Baumol and Sidak refer to
the parity principle as the Efficient Component Pricing Rule ("ECPR").
However, we use the term "parity principle," which Professor Baumol
originally coined.4" To call the rule "efficient" is a misnomer;' despite its
name, the rule as proposed for New Zealand is in general neither necessary47
refusal to interconnect Clear as an ordinary DDI customer to serve the Justice Department was,
as the High Court had previously noted, "a plainly anticompetitive misuse of its dominant
position," id. at 386.
41. Professor Baumol acknowledged on cross-examination that reducing the end price
would require periodic reviews of the interconnection charge. Transcript at 766 11.5-31, 825 1.21,
826 1.22, Telecom Corp. of New Zealand v. Clear Communications, Ltd., [1992] 5 T.C.L.R.
166 (H.C.) [hereinafter High Court Transcript]. Professor Brunt also understood a supervisory
mechanism would be required. [1992] 5 T.C.L.R. at 216.
42. Baumol & Willig, supra note 1, at 27, 31.
43. Id. at 34, 35.
44. Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 181.
45. See William J. Baumol, Some Subtle Pricing Issues in Railroad Regulation, 10 INT'L
J. TRANSP. ECON. 341, 351 (1983). During the course of the New Zealand litigation, the parity
principle became known as the "Baumol-Willig Rule."
46. See TYE, supra note 30; WILLIAM B. TYE ET AL., THE TRANSITION TO
DEREGULATION: DEVELOPING ECONOMIC STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC POLICIES (1991); William B.
Tye, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors: A Response, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 203 (1994);
William B. Tye, Pricing Market Access for Regulated Firms, 29 LOGISTICS & TRANSP. REV. 39
(1993) [hereinafter Pricing Market Access]. For further discussion of alternatives to the efficient
component pricing rule, see William B. Tye, Competitive Access: A Comparative Industry
Approach to the Essential Facility Doctrine, 8 ENERGY L.J. 337 (1987).
47. If A is a necessary condition for B, A must always hold whenever B holds (however,
A may hold even when B does not). Baumol and Sidak write: "The efficient pricing principle for
product components is not only required by the competitive-market standard for defensible
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nor sufficient" for economic efficiency.
In support of their claims, Baumol and Sidak pursue two distinct lines
of argument. First, they analogize the parity principle to the behavior of
competitive firms. Second, they explore the application of the parity principle
to hypothetical examples. Neither approach proves that prices dictated by the
parity principle as proposed for New Zealand are required for efficiency.
Since competitive firms are widely believed to establish efficient prices,
Baumol and Sidak reason that, by analogy, so must the parity principle. The
parity principle "yields a price level set in precisely the same way it would
be in a perfectly competitive or a perfectly contestable market."" 9 Since
"competitive prices will be consistent with economic efficiency" a presumption
is established "that the component-pricing rule is indeed optimal." 5° An
analogy to competitive industries purportedly demonstrates that opportunity-
cost pricing by a monopolist is economically rational: "[I]f the landlord can
earn $90,000 by using the property, the tenant will be required to make good
the $90,000 that is foregone by renting the property."'" The analogy proves
nothing. The fact that both competitive and monopoly firms perform a similar
calculation does not prove they perform the same calculation. Both competitive
firms and monopolists seek to maximize profits, but that does not mean that
their conduct is equally efficient.
Part of the problem with the analogy is that the proponents of the parity
principle use an idiosyncratic definition of "opportunity costs. "52 Note
carefully how opportunity cost is defined: "Economists refer to the sacrifice
of profit unavoidably entailed in an activity as the opportunity cost of that
activity. "" By dint of this semantic device, any monopoly profit is deemed
behavior by an allegedly dominant firm. It is also a necessary condition for economic efficiency,
and hence for promoting the public interest." Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 181. However,
the rule is not necessary for economic efficiency. We show that other access pricing rules will
accomplish efficiency, even under the narrow set of assumptions and definition of efficiency used
in the hypothetical examples.
48. If C is a sufficient condition for D, D holds whenever C holds. The rule is not
sufficient for economic efficiency because, in many circumstances, efficiency cannot be achieved
without invoking "complementary" rules. See Baumol et al., supra note 12, at 3.
49. Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 182.
50. Id. at 183.
51. Id. at 182.
52. "Opportunity cost" is a misleading and extremely confusing term in this context. Under
the assumptions of Baumol and Sidak, the same customer is using the same bottleneck facility
regardless of which carrier serves the competitive portion of the route. Revenues lost to the
incumbent firms as a result of competition are not an opportunity cost for the use of the bottleneck
facility in the true economic sense of the word, as would occur if one customer's use of the facility
displaced that of another customer's.
53. Baumol & Willig, supra note 1, at 11 (first emphasis added).
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an "opportunity cost"54 and included in the price of access.5" Indeed,
monopoly profits are even deemed to be an incremental cost.
The idiosyncratic definition of opportunity cost makes it appear that the
bottleneck monopolist is in reality acting like a competitive firm that is
determining prices based on its incremental costs: "[I]n a competitive market
an incumbent will levy on a new entrant an access charge which will not fail
to cover both the direct incremental cost of providing the access and its
opportunity cost. "56
Clearly nothing of the sort happens in competitive markets. 7 It simply
is not true that the parity principle "yields a price level set in precisely the
same way it would be in a perfectly competitive or a perfectly contestable
market."58 New entrants into competitive markets do not indemnify
incumbents for the opportunity cost of reduced monopoly profits.5 9 In fact,
new entrants into competitive markets do not indemnify incumbents for the loss
of business revenue. It is the intrinsic nature of competition that the
incumbent's position will be eroded. Baumol and Sidak's analogy of the
54. Professor Kahn follows places the term in quotes when applied to the parity principle:
"[W]e choose to surround the term with quotation marks because, in contrast with ordinary usage,
it refers here not to real economic costs-foregone opportunities for the use of real resources to
produce other goods and services-but losses of money profits." Kahn & Taylor, supra note 19,
at 229 n.8. While we do not place quotation marks around the words hereinafter, we note Kahn's
idiosyncratic definition.
55. Monopoly profits are not "unavoidably entailed" in providing the service and thus the
price produced by the parity principle cannot meet even this idiosyncratic definition of opportunity
cost.
56. Baumol & Willig, supra note 1, at 36.
57. As Kahn and Taylor put it, "[T]he Baumol and Sidak essay seems at times to move
from assumption to presumption" at this point in the argument. Kahn & Taylor, supra note 19,
at 231.
58. Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 182 (emphasis added).
59. Id. Nor do competitive firms use "opportunity costs" to determine prices as defined
by Professors Baumol and Willig and as apparently accepted by the Privy Council. This may be
seen by asking what would happen if a competing supplier of the accessed facility entered the
market in competition with its owner (contrary to our assumption here that the bottleneck owner
possessed monopoly power). Would each owner use the "opportunity cost" theory to charge
nothing for use of the facility? This is what the parity principle says, on the grounds that the next
best alternative to the use of the owner's facility is no use of the owner's facility at all. Moreover,
Professor Kahn rebuts the thesis that charging "opportunity costs" is consistent with competitive
behavior, as accepted by the Privy Council. He notes: "[A]s the market for interconnection
becomes competitive, that 'opportunity cost' goes toward zero, because an increase in the amount
of interconnection that it provides does not reduce its retail sales equivalently." Kahn & Taylor,
supra note 19, at 232. Judge Gault also recognized this, observing:
[I]t seems to me that in a perfectly contestable market if there is one supplier
sacrificing profit there will be a rival or potential entrant in a position to supply
without sacrificing profit. . . .That the employment of the perfectly contestable
standard can lead to a price incorporating monopoly profits suggests to me a
contradiction.
Telecom Corp. of N.Z. v. Clear Communications, Ltd., [1993] 4 N.Z.L.B.C. 340, 356 (C.A.)
(Gault, J., concurring), rev'd, [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385 (P.C.).
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landlord's rental to a tenant breaks down, because incumbent firms do not own
property rights to customer access in competitive markets for which they must
be compensated by entrants. Otherwise, incentive for entry into unregulated
markets would be eroded.
The hypothetical examples advanced by Baumol and Sidak also fail to
prove the efficiency properties of the parity principle. They hypothesize the
survival of an inefficient entrant when the bottleneck price is set below that
dictated by the parity principle. To illustrate, Figure 3 uses the same numbers
as Baumol and Sidak, where the inefficient entrant has incremental costs of
$4, $1 in excess of the competitive level. 6' The easiest response to this
example is to simply imagine that another efficient entrant with incremental
costs less than $3 enters the market. Clearly, the new entrant can capture the
traffic and knock out the inefficient firm, so that efficiency is in no way
precluded by the $5.50 price. As long as efficient entry remains possible at
lower prices, the $7 dictated by the parity principle cannot be a necessary
condition for static economic efficiency.
Even without an additional efficient entrant, this illustration of "inefficient
bypass" ignores the prospect of competition by the incumbent, which the $5.50
access price was designed to foster. An inefficient competitor cannot survive
if the incumbent charges the competitive final price of $8.50. Paying $5.50
for the bottleneck portion and incurring $3 in costs on the competitive portion,
any efficient firm will need only $8.50 in retail revenues to cover costs.
Competition will therefore drive down the price for the entire route to $8.50
(see Figure 3). Any firm that is inefficient (including the incumbent) over the
competitive portion will be driven from the market.
Static economic efficiency and even pricing according to opportunity costs
are fully consistent with pricing competitive access at competitive levels, even
in these unrealistic hypotheticals. At a final price to customers of $8.50, the
"opportunity cost" of access will be ($8.50 - 3 - 3 =) $2.50. At this
opportunity cost, the price of access called for by the parity principle is
($3 + 2.50 =) $5.50, the competitive price of access. An $8.50 price of the
final product is called for by the "imputation rules" cited by Baumol and Sidak
($5.50 + 3 = $8.50). The same result could have been reached by simply
starting with a competitive price of $8.50.
The problem with the example provided by Baumol and Sidak lies in
what must be considered as either a hidden assumption or a "complementary
rule" to the parity principle inconsistent with competitive markets. The
example proves the efficiency of the parity principle only under the assumption
60. Note that we are assuming away all the other problems in implementing the parity
principle by simply taking the assumptions in the hypothetical as true. We do not believe that




Competition Can Prevent Inefficiency at "Access Prices"
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that regulation prevents the incumbent and other possible competitors from
charging less than the $10 final price in the example. The same end is achieved
if we reinterpret the parity principle as supplemented by a "complementary
rule" that the retail price must remain at the level that existed prior to entry.
We label the parity principal without the requirement of a fixed retail price
(i.e., both competitors pay the same price of access) as "parity per se."
Professor Kahn foreshadowed that other interconnection prices could be
consistent with weak competitive neutrality, 61 defined as a regime where
ownership of the bottleneck facility should be neither an advanatge nor a
disadvantage with respect to competition in the "contested area" on the basis
of true static efficiency differences. While defending the parity principle on
behalf of Telecom, Professor Kahn concluded that the rule did not achieve its
sweeping claims of economic efficiency. Efficient pricing and entry can be
accomplished by what he calls "competitive parity"-requiring the entrant to
pay the same price as paid by the competitive affiliate of the bottleneck
carrier. 61 It does not matter (at least insofar as "competitive parity" in the
"contested area" is concerned) what the price is as long as the entrant pays
the same price as the monopolist's corporate affiliate.63 Professors Kahn,
Baumol and Willig cannot all be correct. If Professor Kahn is correct, it does
not matter what the price of interconnection is, as far as "competitive parity"
is concerned, as long as everybody pays the same price. If so, then Professors
Baumol and Willig cannot be correct that the parity principle as proposed in
61. Kahn and Taylor provide the clues for such an approach:
That demonstration [Professor Baumol's demonstration that the parity principle
prevents uneconomic entry] must, however, not be permitted to obscure the fact that
price combinations of $6 and $9, $5 and $8, $4 and $7, and $3 and $6 would
likewise ensure that result.
•.. [Tlhe level of contribution incorporated in retail prices-and therefore,
properly, in the wholesale, interconnection charge-must be determined, or must
be assumed to have been determined, by regulators.
Kahn & Taylor, supra note 19, at 231-32. If these are Professor Kahn's concerns, the simple
answer is to choose the competitive price of access.
62. This part of Professor Kahn's "competitive parity" rules could be supported by an
analogy to a group of airlines seeking access to a monopoly airport facility. As long as they all
pay the same rental rate for airport access it does not matter that the airport charges monopoly
prices, insofar as competition on equal terms is concerned. This observation may be true as far
as it goes, but not very helpful in the present circumstances. The facilities of the LEC cannot
readily be segmented into the "contested area" and the bottleneck facility, each managed by a
separate subsidiary of the bottleneck monopolist. Professor Kahn undoubtedly has in mind a
situation more akin to the divestiture of the Bell Operating Companies from AT&T, which was
designed to achieve the competitive parity that his rule seeks to implement. See Alfred E. Kahn,
Deregulation of the Public Utilities-Transitional Problems and Solutions (Apr. 28, 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation) (presented at the Utility
Markets Summit, Wellington, New Zealand). No such divestiture or even intercorporate
segmentation is contemplated in New Zealand.
63. Kahn & Taylor, supra note 19, at 228 ("[Tlhe absolute level of the charge is irrelevant
to the ability of the non-integrated rival to compete with the LEC.").
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New Zealand is necessary for economic efficiency. In fact, weak competitive
neutrality offers little power to discriminate among alternative access pricing
schemes on the basis of static efficiency. Even arbitrary prices of access can
be justified as necessary and sufficient for a level playing field and static
economic efficiency.
To illustrate, suppose we arbitrarily assume the price of access in
Figure 3 to be zero. If efficient entrants can enter at an incremental cost of
$3, the incumbent will compute an opportunity cost of zero for access and
impute an incremental cost (direct incremental cost plus opportunity cost) of
$3 for its own service. The retail price will fall to $3,' but weak competitive
neutrality as defined by the parity principle (static efficiency) nevertheless will
hold.6"
Proponents of the parity principle would object that the bottleneck
monopolist cannot recover its total cost ($8.50). But a requirement that the
monopolist must recover total cost, and not the principle of weak competitive
neutrality and static economic efficiency, is what distinguishes the access price
of $5.50. Static economic efficiency plays no part in discriminating between
the zero access price and the $5.50 price.
The exposition of the parity principle by its proponents can easily confuse
someone untrained as an economist. This confusion has unfortunately not been
corrected by Baumol, Ordover, and Willig who (1) protest that they have been
misinterpreted because they only claimed that parity is a necessary and not
sufficient condition for efficiency,66 (2) claim that parity and a "level playing
field" are necessary to achieve economic efficiency,67 and (3) claim that the
parity principal is "necessary and sufficient for a level playing field" (their
variant of weak competitive neutrality).6
We can resolve the paradox by seeing how restrictive the proof of static
efficiency for the parity principle really is. We simply retrace the "proof" of
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the parity principle, replacing the
parity price with an arbitrary price and removing the artificial handicap that
the monopolist is unable to respond to competition with price changes after
access is opened at the given price. For the purpose of argument, we assume
the parity principle's test for weak competitive neutrality-whether a
64. A price of zero for access does not cover its incremental cost of $3 for the bottleneck
portion. As explained in more detail below, this would have to be cured with a "complementary
rule" that the price of access exceed its incremental cost.
65. Too high a bottleneck price will prevent competition by placing a price squeeze on
the unintegrated competitor. However, too low a price will threaten adequate recovery of the costs
of the bottleneck.
66. "[T]he Privy Council in London, in delivering the final judgement .. . [adopted] the
position we had taken all along." Baumol et al., supra note 12, at 3, n. 1.
67. Id. at 4.
68. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
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monopolist always has a profit incentive to (1) beat a less efficient entrant's
profitable price (given the price of access offered to a less efficient competitor)
and (2) allow entry of more efficient competitors, in a "winner-take-all"
competition. We also assume that the monopolist is required to offer access
to any competitor at any price that meets this test of weak competitive
neutrality, and that the entrant and incumbent always choose prices to
maximize profits.
Given any proposed price of access, the only choice open to the
monopolist in a "winner-take-all" competition is to beat an entrant's least
profitable price. The test of weak competitive neutrality is met as long as the
monopolist finds it profitable to out-compete the entrant if, and only if, the
monopolist is more efficient.
In the general case of Figure 3, any arbitrary price of access will achieve
weak competitive neutrality in the world where there is no demand
elasticity.69 This is also the case where there is demand elasticity but the
monopolist is the more efficient, or equally efficient, in terms of incremental
cost. To account for the case where there is demand elasticity and the
monopolist is less efficient, we limit our arbitrary price to one lower than the
monopoly retail price minus the incremental costs of the more efficient entrant
in the contested area. Otherwise, the monopolist has an incentive to out-
compete the entrant, even though the monopolist is less efficient. We prove
these results by proceeding with the same three cases used in the "proof" of
the efficiency of the parity principle. 0
When the incumbent and entrant are equally efficient, an arbitrary price
of access is clearly sufficient for static economic efficiency because it does not
matter whether the entrant or the incumbent serves the customer. Therefore,
it does not matter what the price of access is, given the parity principle's test
for weak competitive neutrality (most efficient competitor always gets the
business)."
If the incumbent is the lowest incremental cost producer,,the result is the
same although not quite as obviously. If the incumbent always has a profit
incentive to undercut the entrant's minimum profitable price at every arbitrary
price of access, then an arbitrary access price is both a necessary and sufficient
condition for weak competitive neutrality as defined by the theory. The
incumbent will be able to profitably undercut any price offer by the entrant
69. Demand elasticity describes the situation where the quantity of a good or service
demanded by consumers will vary depending on the price. See, e.g., RICHARD G. LIPSEY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE ECONOMICS 100 (1983).
70. Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 185-86.
71. There is no economic rationale for competition among equally efficient competitors
(the usual competitive market standard) once static economic efficiency is elevated to the primary
goal of competition in a regime of "winner-take-all."
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required to pay an arbitrary access price, since the arbitrary access price will
only increase the entrant's existing competitive disadvantage:
ICE + A > IC1 , (1)
where:
ICE = "direct" incremental cost of the entrant in the "contested
area,"
IC, = "direct" incremental cost of the incumbent in the "contested
area,"
A = arbitrary price of access.
Now we introduce the concept of demand elasticity. Define A* to be the
monopolist's "opportunity cost" computed at the incumbent's monopoly
price (P):
A,* = P,* - IC, . (2)
Assume first that the price of access is arbitrarily set at less than the
monopolist's profit maximizing level:
A, > A. (3)
The incumbent can profitably out-compete the inefficient entrant at any price
P, that satisfies the following equation:
ICE + A > P, > IC + A .(4)
The incumbent will maximize profits by out-competing the entrant. The
incumbent will earn A if it equals or exceeds the entrant's minimum profitable
price offer of ICE + A and will earn:
P,- IC, > A (5)
if it does not (see Equation (4)). Since higher prices for the final product are
more profitable, subject to a price constraint of ICE + A (the entrant's
minimum price), the incumbent will always find it profitable to undercut the
less efficient entrant. This offer can only be matched by the entrant's price (PE)
at a loss to the entrant:
PE < ICE + A. (6)
This follows from Equation (4) where P, = PE.
Assume now that
A < A, (7)
The price of access is arbitrarily set above or equal to the monopolist's
opportunity cost computed at the maximum profitable price. Therefore, if the
monopolist matches or exceeds the entrant's lowest possible price, we have
P, a A + ICE . (8)
The monopolist does better to undercut the entrant's minimum price and charge
P,* = A,* + IC, (9)
to maximize profits. Since A* is more profitable than A by assumption, P; must
always be more profitable than a price that satisfies Equation (8). Therefore,
any arbitrary price of access will produce a minimum profitable price by a less
efficient entrant that can always be profitably undercut by the incumbent in
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a "winner-take-all" competition.
If the incumbent is the highest incremental cost producer, we now
demonstrate that any arbitrary price of access less than or equal to the price
that appropriates all of the entrant's efficiency advantages at the incumbent's
monopoly price will produce a minimum profitable price by the entrant that
will never be undercut profitably by the incumbent, and all access prices at
higher levels will always be profitably undercut. Let:
A**= P,*- ICE (10)
We will show that any arbitrary access price less than A* is a necessary and
sufficient condition for weak competitive neutrality.
Assume A** > A. We have by assumption:
IC, + A > ICE + A. (11)
Therefore, the incumbent cannot profitably undercut any price by the entrant
PE such that:
IC, + A > P, > ICE + A . (12)
Any demand forthcoming at a retail price by the entrant meeting this test
will be captured entirely by the entrant. The reason is that the incumbent will
earn A if it does not match the price and
P,- ICl < A (13)
if it matches or undercuts the entrant's price. This follows from Equation (12),
where P, = PE. The incumbent's profit maximizing strategy is to price always
in excess of the entrant when the price of access is equal to or below A**. The
monopolist will always be motivated to fully impute the access price (A) to
its own higher cost service if the access price is less than or equal to the level
necessary to appropriate the more efficient entrant's competitive advantages
at the monopoly price.
When A > A**, the monopolist will always have an incentive to undercut
the more efficient rival for the same reason as shown in the proof above.
Therefore, if the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent, any
arbitrary price of access less than or equal to the monopoly retail price minus
the entrant's incremental cost is both necessary and sufficient for efficiency.
If the monopolist is more efficient than the entrant, then any arbitrary price
whatsoever is necessary and sufficient for efficiency. QED.
Anticipating the possible complaint that these arbitrary prices of access
do not achieve efficient prices (PE and PI) for the final product, we reply that
our arbitrary pricing rules are only necessary and sufficient conditions for
static efficiency and weak competitive neutrality, and can not be blamed for
not being a cure-all. To the objection that the incumbent will have no incentive
to supply access unless forced to do so if A is less than the incremental cost
of access, again we reply that our rules only look at static efficiency in the
supply of service in the contested area. Obviously, the rule of arbitrary pricing
must be supplemented with appropriate "complementary rules" to cure these
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other deficiencies. Finally, we could "cook" the results to generate a desired
access price from among the set of arbitrary ones by choosing the appropriate
set of "complementary rules," perhaps only implicitly, and by rejecting other
"complementary rules" as intolerable burdens on economic efficiency.
If it were not for the fact that the above sophistry produces a dubious
result, our theorem that arbitrary pricing of access is a necessary and sufficient
condition for static economic efficiency in the supply of service in the
"contested area" would be capable of inflicting great harm. The proof merely
shows that the incumbent and entrant should pay the same price, that the price
should not force a more efficient entrant to charge higher than monopoly
prices. It says nothing about what that same price of access should be. In the
wrong hands, practitioners of the arbitrary pricing theory would claim that
their theory was the sole defender of efficiency goals, that any opposing theory
could only be interpreted as espousing non-efficiency goals, that any opposing
theory called for requiring the monopolist to supply access at a different price
than that at which it supplied itself, etc.
Obviously, our goal here is not to espouse arbitrary pricing of access.
The point is that seemingly innocuous changes in the assumptions in these
claims for unique static efficiency results can turn supposedly unambiguous
results into highly peculiar or even arbitrary results.
Baumol, Ordover, and Willig have recently offered their own set of
"ancillary provisos" that promise to render the parity principle both
unobjectionable and meaningless.72 It is hard to quarrel with a rule that
simply requires all competitors to pay the same price for access (parity per se),
subject to whatever complementary rules are required to avoid the adverse
consequences of its application standing alone. Parity per se, shorn of its
defects (e.g., application to the retail pricing of an unregulated monopolist),
then becomes the "stone in the stone soup" of access pricing. Parity per se sits
at the center of the pot, surrounded by arguments about what "ancillary
provisos" are necessary to make it produce a competitive result.
In the New Zealand dispute, the assumption that a given price for its final
product must be sustained by the monopolist was critical to the static efficiency
claims for the parity principle. Baumol, Ordover, and Willig justify the
assumption of a given price on the grounds that the monopolist "cannot afford
to charge a price as low as that of a rival" unless it charges for access to rivals
what it is already implicitly charging to its own customers.73 What is the test
72. Baumol et al., supra note 12, at 21-25.
73. "[S]uch an inefficiency will clearly occur whenever the prospective supplier who incurs
the lower real incremental cost in providing the final product cannot afford to charge a price as
low as that of a rival with a higher incremental cost of supplying the output in question." Id. at
4.
Baumol et al. argue that such an inefficient outcome can be avoided only by the
monopolist's charging its rivals for access the amount it is already implicitly charging its own
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of what the monopolist can "afford"? The answer built into the parity principle
as proposed in New Zealand is that the monopolist can "afford" no price that
produces less profit than it would make in the absence of entry. This is indeed
a strange, permanent constraint to impose on a pricing regime designed to
achieve a transition to deregulation and effective competition.
We cannot agree with the standard of weak competitive neutrality
encompassed in the parity principle, nor can we agree that all of the difficulties
with the parity principle can necessarily be cured by constraining the optimal
choice of retail price to the customer. We conclude rather that the "winner-
take-all" vision of the competitive equilibrium is an inappropriate test of weak
neutrality for most of the emerging network industries to which the theory has
been applied.
Demonstrations that the parity principle is a necessary and sufficient
condition for economic efficiency make implicit assumptions that may be
hidden to most observers. One assumption is that the only efficiency that
counts is static economic efficiency-which carrier has the lowest incremental
cost. Another implicit assumption is that the test for weak competitive
neutrality must be a "winner-take-all" competitive regime-a less efficient firm
as measured in terms of incremental costs must be foreclosed from the market
entirely. Since an equally efficient entrant cannot recover sunk costs, that firm
would be foreclosed from the market as well. In fact, if there are sunk costs,
an efficient entrant will enter the business only if it does not know that the rule
will be applied (the case of the U.S. rail industry).
The parity principle imposes a definition of weak competitive neutrality
that is not imposed on other oligopolistic industries. There, multiple firms sell
at prices in excess of incremental costs. Any firm with an incremental cost
disadvantage bears the full cost of that handicap, yet is not barred entirely from
the market. If dynamic benefits of competition are ignored, it will almost
always be possible to argue static efficiency gains from eliminating competitors
in oligopolistic industries.74 But this test for weak competitive neutrality is
not the correct standard in an industry with rapid technological change seeking
a successful transition from regulation or public ownership to effective
competition.
customers. They conclude from the parity principle that:
[The] price that the bottleneck-owner firm charges itself for bottleneck input is
simply the price the firm charges to the final-product customer, minus the
incremental cost to that firm of the remaining inputs of the final product .... [T]he
price that the bottleneck owner implictly charges itself for [the] bottleneck input [is]
the price at which competing final-product should be entitled to purchase bottleneck
input.
Id. at 10.
74. N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency, 17
RAND J. ECON. 48, 48-58 (1986).
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To illustrate this point, Baumol and Sidak75 propose that the parity
principle be used to compute prices for electric utilities opening up their
transmission systems to competitive access. Assume that regulators accept that
electric utilities were "exactly analogous" to railroads and every utility was
instructed to apply the logic of Figure 1 to price access at its opportunity cost.
Each utility could have a different final price, incremental cost, and
opportunity cost. Believing that the necessary and sufficient conditions for
static efficiency and weak competitive neutrality had been satisfied, regulators
might be led to believe that the task is over.
However, the "winner-take-all" model of competition, with its use of the
incumbent's incremental cost as the benchmark for measuring entrants'
efficiency, breaks down when there is more than one monopolist and mobility
of entrants. In a competitive market for the "contested area" (electricity
generation), the task of a common competitive price in all service territories
is to give appropriate efficiency signals. Instead, the parity principle assigns
different revenues to entrants based on the monopolist's avoided incremental
costs. The efficiency of both incumbents and entrants in a particular service
territory should be measured against this common competitive price-not the
incremental cost of the incumbent-just as in any competitive market. Rather
than foreclosing a less efficient entrant, the price of access should encourage
both entrant and incumbent to supply electricity if price exceeds their
incremental costs. All inefficient competitors, incumbents and entrants alike,
will fully bear the costs of their inefficiency, the appropriate standard for weak
competitive neutrality in a competitive market.
Different prices for the "contested area" for different service territories
give customers different, incorrect signals for the price of the unbundled
service in the "contested area". It is difficult to see how all these problems
with the price of power could be cured by changing the price of the final
service as claimed by the parity principle.
Of course, it might be possible to cure the parity principle with a
"complementary rule" that forces all prices for electric generation (at the same
time and place) into equality. But that solution raises the question as to why
one should not simply dispense with measuring the incumbent's opportunity
costs, create a competitive wholesale market to which all suppliers have access
under conditions which achieve weak and strong neutrality as defined here,
and let competition on equal terms take its course.
We supplement the concept of weak competitive neutrality with that of
"strong" competitive neutrality. Strong competitive neutrality arises when an
interconnection regime allows equally efficient competitors an equal
75. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TRANSMISSION PRICING AND STRANDED
COSTS IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY (1995).
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opportunity to expect to earn their cost of capital, compensates the incumbent
for any legacies of regulation, and purges the interconnection price of
monopoly rents (if any). Strong competitive neutrality includes weak
competitive neutrality, but not vice versa. As we have demonstrated, a wide
range of access pricing rules can achieve weak competitive neutrality. This
rather profound result permits us to concentrate on strong neutrality, which
is the much more important and useful condition. This means competition will
be more fair and will allow equal dynamic competition for new products and
services that require investments, as well as efficient operations. The parity
principle, as proposed in New Zealand, fails the test even in the unrealistic
hypothetical examples offered in its support.
Baumol, Ordover, and Willig use their proof that the parity principle is
necessary and sufficient for competition on equal terms for a given retail price
to conclude that all skeptics of parity as they define it must be imposing some
non-efficiency objectives onto the access pricing scheme. But this is the same
fallacy that confused (1) a proof of the necessary and sufficient conditions for
efficiency given these restrictive assumptions with (2) more general proof of
efficiency. Since other rules will also achieve static efficiency, it does not
necessarily follow that critics of parity are abandoning efficiency goals for
other pursuits or that there must be "demonstrable efficiency costs" associated
with other proposals.
It may be true in some cases that skeptics object to the sole focus on
efficiency. But this does not capture the gravamens of the most compelling
objections to the rule. The objections really are to: (1) making a narrow
concept of static efficiency the centerpiece of access pricing without conceding
just how permissive this standard really is; (2) constraining the application of
the rule with implicit assumptions that prevent it from accomplishing richer
definitions of efficiency; (3) erroneously alleging that richer and more realistic
definitions of the problem impair economic efficiency; (4) demonstrating
antipathy or even extreme hostility to the use of access pricing to force
monopoly incumbents to price competitively in the face of entry and preferring
instead direct control on the retail price level; (5) alleging that the monopolist
cannot "afford" to charge the lower retail prices that would be forced to meet
competition at access prices lower than those called for by the parity principle.
In reality, access pricing can achieve the broader goals of efficiency espoused
by its critics without sacrificing the idea of competitive neutrality, broadly
defined.
A separate efficiency argument made on behalf of the parity principle
concerns an alleged Universal Service Obligation (USO) unique to the
incumbent. The argument is that the incumbent's obligation to provide
unprofitable service to remote areas requires a cross-subsidy from more
lucrative services. Unless the parity principle is applied, inefficient companies
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can enter and turn a profit by targeting lucrative services only. Cost-based
interconnection policies are then criticized as encouraging uneconomic entry
to evade the cross-subsidy and imposing an unfair competitive disadvantage
on the incumbent. Even apart from situations where an imagined burden is
used by incumbents to impose unjustified anticompetitive policies, the USO
becomes a rationalization for anticompetitive interconnection prices that go far
beyond what is necessary to correct for any asymmetry. However, any burden
from a USO can be handled in a competitively neutral manner independent of
the interconnection regime. This involves three steps:
1. Developing a verifiable estimate of the magnitude of the
required cross-subsidy;
2. Limiting the distortion of the access price and the distribution
of the subsidy to only that level required to achieve
competitive neutrality (in both the favored and disfavored
markets); and
3. Developing a pro-competitive access policy independent of the
cross-subsidy mechanism.
If the USO required additional funding on an annual basis, such funding
should be conducted on non-discriminatory terms. The United Kingdom's
Office for Telecommunications (OFTEL) has proposed creative mechanisms
for dealing with the universal service obligation in that country. The proposal
involves quantifying the amount of burden, if any, and funding it through a
separate account to which all telecommunications services contribute
periodically on a non-discriminatory basis.76 The advantage of this proposal
lies in its clarity. The account cannot be tapped for unrelated purposes, cannot
be funded exclusively by one network provider, and can be accessed equally
by any competitor that provides services deemed to be burdensome. Under this
approach, the entrant would receive credit for the residential customers it
supplied. Because competitively neutral schemes77 are possible in conjunction
with any interconnection proposal, the USO provides no unique justification
for the parity principle.
In a dynamic industry such as telecommunications, regulators should
choose an interconnection pricing policy to achieve the dynamic benefits of
76. Professor Willig has supported a similar "competitively neutral" funding of the
incumbent's service obligations. Willig Testimony, supra note 32, at 5.
77. For an examination of the competitive neutrality properties of various recovery
mechanisms for such burdens in a regulatory transition, see William B. Tye & Frank C. Graves,
The Economics of Negative Barriers to Entry: How to Recover Stranded Costs and Achieve
Competition on Equal Terms (Feb. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal
on Regulation).
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competition. Static efficiency gains and competitive prices to customers will
probably take care of themselves in most circumstances, because static
economic efficiency (and even access pricing based on opportunity costs, if
that term is given the broad meaning employed more recently by its
proponents) is a surprisingly robust property of access schemes that
successfully induce competition. But common sense should have told us all
along that competitive prices and economic efficiency are fully compatible.
C. The Threat to Effective Competition
The failure to purge interconnection prices of monopoly rents is not the
only weakness of the parity principle. An even greater danger is that the parity
principle will threaten competitive pricing and efficient entry in the relevant
market because it does not achieve competition on equal terms.
The parity principle is biased because it assigns the incumbent ownership
of the profit and the revenues needed to recover its sunk costs. The entrant has
to "buy" the customers by paying the incumbent the foregone profit and sunk
cost for each customer obtained.78 In the Clear dispute, this notion of
ownership took an extreme form in Telecom's insistence that the opportunity
cost of foregone profit include all future consumers of local loop services. 79
Anticompetitive consequences of the rule arise chiefly from the central
role of sunk costs in network industries such as telecommunications. Under
such circumstances, the rule requires ° that the incumbent implement a price
squeeze (i.e., Telecom will have to price interconnection so as to squeeze
Clear's revenues down to incremental costs). Competitors who capture business
must reimburse the incumbent for the revenues necessary to amortize the
monopolist's sunk costs. Because all firms must price in excess of incremental
costs, no firm would voluntarily sink costs to build a telecommunications
network knowing it would be exposed to such a price squeeze. The rule in
78. Likewise, Professor Kahn has noted that the parity principle does not achieve
competition on equal terms. Rather, he argues that the rule's preferential treatment of the
incumbent is justified by principles found in traditional rate-of-return regulation: "The treatment
under our rules of the incumbent telephone company and its would-be rivals is indeed
asymmetrical. The justification is that the former are and have been thoroughly regulated public
utility enterprises . . . ." Kahn & Taylor, supra note 19, at 236 (emphasis added).
79. Professor Baumol was asked on cross-examination, "[A] levy applying your
opportunity cost principle is designed to maintain Telecom's present benefits and future
expectations?" He replied, "That's right." High Court Transcript, supra note 41, at 790 1.25
(emphasis added).
80. As Professor Willig notes, the model requires a price squeeze on an unintegrated
competitor: "A dominant firm can execute a perfect price squeeze and thereby earn all the
monopoly profits available in the market for the package of complementary products." J.A.
Ordover et al., Nonprice Anticompetitive Behavior by Dominant Firms Towards the Producers of





effect creates a first-mover advantage, since only the first firm to sink
investments will ordinarily be allowed to recover these costs.
The problem that sunk costs pose for competition on equal terms can be
explored by imagining identical investments by the incumbent and the entrant
in a new service. We assume both firms are equally efficient, which is
normally an ideal situation for effective competition. The investments are
significant, but after they are made the future incremental costs become
minimal. The day after the entrant makes its investment, the parity principle
requires an access price equivalent to the incumbent's revenues less the
minimal incremental cost of the incumbent's service. The parity principle price
will leave no revenues for an equally efficient entrant to recover its sunk
investment, because a first-mover advantage is implicitly built into the rule.
Under the rule, the entrant will have no incentive to undertake the investments
necessary to compete, despite its equal, or even greater, efficiency.
Figure 4 shows how the parity principle will prevent effective competition
on equal terms in the relevant market, by violating strong competitive
neutrality, as defined above. In the example, the costs of the proposed
competitor and bottleneck owner are broken down into fixed and variable costs
totalling $2. Fixed costs are associated with investment in equipment, while
variable costs refer to operating costs once the equipment is installed. Prior
to entry, the concept of long-run incremental cost would include both the fixed
and variable costs of the investment. However, the day after entry, the fixed
costs in equipment investment have already been sunk.8
81. In endorsing the parity principle before the High Court, Baumol and Willig often uses
the term "incremental costs" without clearly specifying whether the term refers to the long-run
or the short-run. At critical points in the argument, undefined terms such as "pertinent costs" are
used in describing the costs of the incumbent monopolist that are avoided by use of the
competitor's services. Baumol & Willig, supra note 1, at 29. Baumol, Ordover, and Willig define
incremental cost to include "the requisite capital," without defining that term. Apologists for the
parity principle take this ambiguity as evidence that the Rule is not designed to indemnify the
monopolist for its sunk costs in the "contested area," and that the incumbent's recovery of sunk
costs is not guaranteed. However, Baumol and Willig conclude that "[A]II its [the bottleneck
owner's] costs are covered one way or the other." Id. at 23. Baumol and Willig's brief states that
the price of access should be reduced by "the incremental cost that this foregone sale would
otherwise have brought to Telecom New Zealand," because "incremental cost by definition
includes no portion of fixed cost." Id. (emphasis added). Baumol and Willig clearly rebuts the
inference that the monopolist should not be indemnified for its sunk costs in the "contested area"
and claim that one of the benefits of the Rule is to prevent the entrant from duplicating the
incumbent's sunk costs:
It is true that an entrant may need to replicate some of the incumbent's activities or
facilities, and that the costs of such duplication may render the entrant unprofitable.
But, if that is the case under efficient component pricing, then the requisite
replication of costs correspondingly renders the entry inefficient and ultimately
harmful to consumers and to society.
Id. at 36. This effectively rebuts contentions made from time to time that deny the finding of
Judge Cooke of the Court of Appeal that the parity principle "would amount to allowing a new
entry into the market on condition that the competitor indemnify the monopolist against any loss
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FIGURE 4
The Parity Principle Will Prevent
Effective Competition in the "Contested Area"
Price over entire route = $10.00
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The Day of Entry:
* Entrant purchases necessary production equipment.
* Incremental cost:
Fixed cost (equipment investment) + variable cost = $2.00
The Day After Entry:
* Equipment investment costs are now sunk.
* Post-investment incremental cost = variable cost = $1.00
* Based on the post-investment incremental cost,
bottleneck carrier uses the parity principle to set price of access at $9.00.
Result: Applying the parity principle would force the entrant to lose $1.00
per unit and, realizing that, the entrant would never enter the market
in the first place.
of custom." Telecom Corp. of N.Z. v. Clear Communications, Ltd., [1993] 4 N.Z.B.L.C. 340,
343 (C.A.), rev'd, [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385 (P.C.). See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 24. Certainly,
every court took Baumol's and Willig's brief to stand for full indemnification of all sunk costs,
and proponents of the parity principle criticize alternatives precisely because they fail to indemnify
the incumbent for its sunk costs and deny entrants those same revenues. See Baumol & Sidak,
supra note 6, at 201; Kahn & Taylor, supra note 19, at 235-38.
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Incremental costs will therefore include only the $1 operating cost of the
equipment. Given a $10 price over the entire route, the bottleneck owner
maximizes profits by using the parity principle to raise the bottleneck price to
($10 - 1 =) $9, appropriating the sunk costs of the entrant's investment. The
result stifles competition because it leaves the entrant no incentive to undertake
the necessary investments. Once the entrant has invested in equipment, the
monopolist has the incentive to raise its price and allow an entrant recovery
of no more than the incremental costs of the competitive service.
The impact of the parity principle on the monopolist's fixed costs is quite
different. The monopolist calculates the parity principle price by deducting
from its revenues its incremental costs over the competitive portion of the
route. If the service over the competitive portion involves sunk costs, they will
not be deducted in determining the parity principle price; only variable costs
will be deducted.8 2 In the more general case where the monopolist has already
sunk costs and the entrant is seeking access, the established incumbent
monopolist can usually foreclose competitive entry under the parity principle
simply by requiring all incumbents to indemnify it for its sunk costs prior to
competitive entry. As noted, the monopolist is indemnified under the rule for
his sunk costs strictly by virtue of his arrival at the market first.
Introducing the more realistic assumption of sunk costs into the access
pricing problem creates a conflict between true competition on equal terms (or
true competitive neutrality, including the strong degree discussed above) and
the monopolist's indifference to competition after costs are sunk. Both tests
cannot be met. Proponents of the parity principle for New Zealand implicitly
resolved this conflict by alowing a first-mover advantage to the incumbent
monopolist. They chose the monopolist's indifference to competition (and the
associated indemnification of all sunk costs) over true competitive neutrality
(i.e., equal opportunity for both carriers to recover sunk costs in the contested
area of the market).
Indeed, one of the economic advantages cited for the parity principle is
that it will deny the entrant the revenues "an entrant may need to replicate
some of the incumbent's activities or facilities" 3 and thereby "discourages
inefficient entry." 8' "[AIll [the incumbent's] costs are covered one way or
the other" under the rule, 5 clearly indicating that the rule intends to
indemnify the incumbent monopolist for all sunk costs. Kahn and Taylor make
it quite clear that they believe that the claimed static efficiency benefits of the
82. In the telecommunications industry, the price for interconnection dictated by the parity
principle would represent nearly the entire price over the route. This is because the variable costs
associated with carrying a call are very small.
83. Baumol & Willig, supra note 1, at 36.
84. Id. at 17.
85. Id. at 34.
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parity principle follow from indemnifying the incumbent for its sunk costs
because those revenues are denied to entrants.86
We find it difficult to reconcile such clear statements of intentional
first-mover advantage conferred on the incumbent under the parity principle
with statements that the parity principle seeks to achieve a level playing
field 7 and "competitive parity" between incumbents and entrants88. The
parity principle does not prevent a "price squeeze." Indeed, it mandates one
on the theory that the revenues needed by the competitor to recover its sunk
costs are the bottleneck owner's "opportunity costs."' 9
Proponents of the parity principle have responded by claiming that similar
price squeezes can occur in competitive markets, even where a "bottleneck"
carrier is not vertically integrated into the competing portion of the route.9"
However, that competition might be suppressed in other situations does not
render such conduct efficient. It does not excuse the parity principle for
requiring such an outcome. Squeezing the entrant's revenues down to
incremental costs in the presence of large sunk costs is simply not a
competitive pricing standard. A competitive market would never produce such
a result.9' Moreover, in competitive markets, entrants do not pay the sunk
86. Kahn and Taylor state:
The non-marginal, common or fixed costs of incumbent telephone companies and
competitors alike are irrelevant to the efficient distribution of the contested business
among them. The only relevant determinant is their comparative marginal costs, and
that is the basis on which the rules of competitive parity and efficient component
pricing would ensure that efficient outcome.
[I]f, in order to enter the market, the would-be competitor must itself
incur common, fixed costs of supplying a number of services, some portion of which
it must recover in the price of the competitive service, production by two firms,
each of them incurring significant fixed costs, is socially inefficient If the incumbent
telephone companies could profitably retain the competitive business at prices
covering only their marginal costs but the challengers require some larger markup,
in order to recover for themselves some of their fixed, common costs, then it is
inefficient for society to make it possible for the latter to do so; it would involve
the wasteful duplication and incurrence of new, additional common costs of facilities
and activities already provided by the incumbent. As Baumol and Sidak point out,
the total costs incurred by society would be inflated by the additional fixed costs
incurred by the entrants, even though they might require no larger contribution than
the LECs to the recovery of those costs.
Kahn & Taylor, supra note 19, at 237-38 (citation omitted).
87. Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 198.
88. Kahn & Taylor, supra note 19, at 227.
89. The parity principle also forecloses competition because it requires an anticompetitive
cross subsidy between the competitive and the monopolized sector. By charging $9 for the use
of the bottleneck in Figure 5, the monopolist is in effect only charging $1 for the competitive
service, well below its long-run incremental cost of $2. For further explanation of the cross
subsidy inherent in the parity principle, see Rail Competition, supra note 33, at 77.
90. Id.
91. With regard to Telecom's claims for indemnification even for lost new business, Judge
Gault stated that "[t]hat without doubt is something only a monopolist could assert" Telecom Corp.
of N.Z. v. Clear Communications, Ltd., [1993] 4 N.Z.L.B.C. 340, 356 (C.A.), rev'd, [1995]
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costs of the incumbent as a price of access in order to make them indifferent
to entry.92 When a new hotel is built, the investor does not send a check to
existing hotels in the neighborhood to compensate them for lost business. The
incumbent's recovery of sunk costs can be eroded by entry in a competitive
market.
Another alleged justification for preferential treatment of the incumbent's
sunk costs lies in regulatory economics. One feature particular to regulatory
economics is "uneconomic bypass." Uneconomic bypass typically concerns
the prospect that the utility's loss of sales volume will raise rates for captive
customers. The utility's rates are set to recover its sunk costs over all units
of output. As the utility loses business, the regulator will increase rates in
order to recover the same costs over a lower volume. The inequity stems from
the ability of some customers, such as large industrial users or municipalized
territories," to leave the service territory while other consumers are held
"captive" to the utility. Thus, captive customers may be injured by the
departure of others. Setting an access price that protects the sunk costs of the
utility helps avoid this problem." However, the typical uneconomic bypass
problem cannot occur in competitive industries. In competitive industries, an
incumbent's loss of sales volume does not trigger an automatic price increase
threatening to harm "captive" consumers. Instead, competitive companies are
more likely to decrease their prices in response to increased competition.
A second circumstance warranting preferential treatment for an incumbent
involves transitions from a regime of rate base/rate of return regulation where
investors had not been previously compensated for the risk that assets would
be "stranded" as a result of transition to competition. 95 This appears to be
1 N.Z.L.R. 385 (P.C.).
92. The District of Columbia Circuit explained that:
[I]f a company can charge a former customer for the fixed cost of its product
whether or not the customer wants that product, and can tie this cost to the delivery
of a bottleneck monopoly product that the customer must purchase, the products are
as effectively tied as they would be in a traditional tying arrangement.
Cajun Elec. Power Coop. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 173, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1994). While we do not agree
with the Court that recovery of stranded cost is necessarily anticompetitive as a theoretical matter,
Figure 4 would represent the type of situation that alarmed the Court.
93. In the United States, a customer can sometimes acquire special rights for purchasing
electricity by declaring itself a municipality under applicable regulations. See "Sham
Municipalizations" Seen Arising to Circumvent Retail Wheeling Bans, ELECTRIC UTIL. WKLY.,
Apr. 4, 1994, at 17.
94. On the potential for uneconomic bypass in a regime of rate regulation, see William
B. Tye, The Economics of Public Convenience and Necessityfor Regulated Industries, 60 TRANSP.
PRAc. J. 143 (1993).
95. See William B. Tye & Johannes P. Pfeifenberger, The Not-So-Strange Economics of
Stranded Investment (A Reply), 7 ELECTRICITY J. 3, 80 (1994); Reply Testimony of A. Lawrence
Kolbe and William B. Tye, Proposed Rules: Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, 18 CFR § 35 (Aug. 15, 1994) (No. RM94-7-000) (statement on file with
the Yale Journal on Regulation).
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Professor Kahn's concern when he emphasizes that regulated utilities operate
"under an arrangement that is supposed to assure them a fair opportunity to
recover a return on and of their prudently undertaken investments, in exchange
for regulatory limitations on their earnings. "96 However, the current investors
in Telecom are not part of a traditional regulatory compact. Telecom was
privatized through a sale of shares to the public with full knowledge that the
company was subject to competition. Both the risks and rewards of competition
were factored into the demand for the shares. Under competition, cost recovery
is determined by the ability to satisfy the consumer more efficiently. Cost
recovery does not rely on which competitor first entered the market. Applying
the parity principle introduces asymmetrical treatment, without a regulatory
compact to show for it.
If anything, the parity principle should be most welcome among
regulatory authorities. Regulators may be inclined to treat the incumbent
preferentially because it operates under both regulatory constraints and
assurances. Nevertheless, the adverse consequences of the parity principle have
persuaded several regulatory authorities not to adopt it.
97
Proponents of the parity principle have argued that private contracts can
protect entrants from the price squeeze inherent in the parity principle. The
entrant's total costs include future fixed costs in equipment investment. They
have argued that a long-term contract signed before investments are undertaken
could guarantee the future recovery of these costs.9" Interestingly enough,
a contract to protect sunk costs would suspend the parity principle throughout
the life of the contract.
This suggested contractual solution requires a "complementary rule"
preventing the parity principle from being applied for the duration of the
contract. Otherwise, the contract can itself be undercut by the logic of the
parity principle. The owner of the bottleneck will have an incentive to engage
in opportunistic behavior after the connecting carrier incurs sunk costs,
whatever the contract might say. Indeed, bottleneck carriers have in the past
successfully argued that such contracts should be revoked precisely because
they are inconsistent with the parity principle.
Figure 4 shows how the logic of the parity principle can be used against
a long-term contract that seeks to protect the sunk costs of entrants. For the
96. Kahn & Taylor, supra note 19, at 236.
97. In re Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Company Facilities; Amendment
of the Part 69 Allocation of General Support Facility Costs, 7 F.C.C.R. 7369 144 (1992);
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS [ENGLAND], A FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE COMPETITION
(1994); In re Application of MFS Intelenet of Maryland Inc. for Authority to Provide and Resell
Local Exchange and Interexchange Telephone Service, No. 71155 (Md. P.S.C. Apr. 25, 1994).
98. See, e.g., Seaboard Testimony, supra note 34. For another example of this view, see
David Reiffen & Andrew N. Kleit, Terminal Railroad Revisited: Foreclosure of an Essential




purpose of argument, the courts are assumed to adopt the parity principle as
the optimal pricing rule. The prospective entrant correctly anticipates that the
fixed costs of its investment will be threatened by the parity principle once the
investment is made. Given a $10 price for the entire route, the entrant will
therefore demand a long-run contract for access to the bottleneck at $8, leaving
sufficient revenues of $2 to recover all costs of the investment contemplated.
(Indeed, prior to sinking costs, the price of access justified by the parity
principle would be ($10 - 2 =) $8.) To get past the hurdle of requiring
entrants to indemnify the bottleneck owner for its sunk costs, assume that these
customers are brand new and, therefore, the bottleneck carrier has incurred
no sunk costs. With a contract in hand,99 the investments are sunk by both
carriers.
Herein lies another threat of the parity principle to effective competition.
Once the contract is signed, the bottleneck carrier has a strong incentive to turn
around and break the contract as soon as the entrant's investments are
made."° The principle of indifference is immediately violated after
investments are sunk, because the monopolist's indifference is short-term by
nature. (Note that the monopolist earns $1 more on all traffic that moves
wholly over its own system than when it provides access to a competitor at
the contract price of $8.) Some of the chief proponents of the parity principle
would justify breaking such a contract precisely because it violates the parity
principle!"' Endorsed in public policy, the parity principle thus becomes the
rationale for undercutting efficient contractual solutions to the competitive
99. To make the example even more realistic, assume that the contract was signed at this
price because regulators required competition on equal terms as we would define it. This is exactly
what has happened in at least one case in the U.S. rail industry.
100. The incentives for opportunistic behavior in similar situations are discussed by Klein,
Crawford, and Alchian:
An appropriable quasi-rent is not a monopoly rent in the usual sense, that is, the
increased value of an asset protected from market entry over the value it would have
had in an open market. An appropriable quasi-rent can occur with no market
closure or restrictions placed on rival assets. Once installed, an asset may be so
expensive to remove or so specialized to a particular user that if the price paid to
the owner were somehow reduced the asset's services to that user would not be
reduced. Thus, even if there were free and open competition for entry to the market,
the specialization of the installed asset to a particular user (or more accurately the
high costs of making it available to others) creates a quasi rent, but no "monopoly"
rent.
Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting
Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 299 (1978).
101. Abottleneck railroad recently argued that contracts signed with the connecting carrier
in the past were inconsistent with the parity principle. These contracts were signed pursuant to
a regime of regulation designed to prevent the price squeeze-in other words, the very contractual
solution to the incentives for a price squeeze inherent in the parity principle. The contractual
solution was said to be inefficient precisely because it prevented the bottleneck carrier from
following the parity principle. See generally Seaboard Testimony, supra note 34.
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access problem. '02
Proponents of the parity principle do not directly address the important
temporal element in measuring incremental costs and the problems of sunk cost
recovery. Rather, confusion arises from the different definitions assigned to
"incremental cost." In their brief to the High Court, Baumol and Willig state
that "incremental cost includes incremental opportunity cost."" 3 Not
surprisingly then, confusions over the multiple meanings given to opportunity
cost have simultaneously infected the meaning of "incremental cost," with
profound significance to the prices called for under the opportunity cost theory.
The price of access based on "opportunity cost" is defined as Telecom's
"incremental revenue minus the incremental costs that this foregone sale would
otherwise have brought to Telecom New Zealand."" The results of the
pricing rule thus depend critically on the definition of incremental costs from
the foregone sale. Unfortunately, a review of the writings in support of the
parity principle permits a variety of definitions. At certain critical points of
the argument, undefined terms such as "pertinent costs" °5 cloud the picture
as to exactly what is to be deducted from the incumbent's revenues to
determine the price of access.
Baumol and Willig state that "incremental cost [is] the amount by which
the firm's total cost increases when it supplies the product or service."106
At times, they convey the strong impression that incremental costs should be
calculated only for a small increment of volume at issue and without
consideration of the fixed or sunk costs incurred to provide the service in the
contested area. 0 7 This prevents the computation of the long-run per-unit
incremental costs of providing the entire competitive service, defined as
follows: "The total service incremental cost of the entire service, call it service
X, is defined as the difference in the firm's total costs with and without service
X supplied."' 1 A requirement to recover revenues in excess of incremental
costs by the monopolist is asserted to recover a "net contribution towards its
fixed and common costs," 10 9 although it is unclear as to whether these costs
are incurred in supplying the bottleneck service, the competitive service, or
are joint costs of both services. In multi-product industries, such as
telecommunications, with large sunk costs, the differences between these
102. For a discussion of the "contractual equilibrium," see John R. Meyer & William B.
Tye, Toward Achieving Workable Competition in Industries Undergoing a Transition to
Deregulation, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 273 (1988).
103. Baumol & Willig, supra note 1, at 24.
104. Id. at 23.
105. Id. at 29.
106. Id. at 10.
107. Id. at 23-24, 31-32.
108. Baumol AT&T Testimony, supra note 17, at 10.
109. Id. at 29.
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costing concepts is considerable. The rule by which these costs are determined
greatly affects price.
It is thus very easy to find quotations suggesting that the "pertinent costs"
used to calculate the price of access are the shortest of the short run, based
on small increments (not an entire service), and inclusive of no recovery of
fixed or sunk costs in supplying the competitive service. Before concluding
that incremental cost is only a short-term concept, however, we note that it
is equally possible to find language indicating exactly opposite conclusions.
Baumol and Sidak use the "average incremental cost" in their formal derivation
of the rule.1"' Since this "includes any fixed cost that must be incurred on
behalf of that product alone,""' it would appear that "product specific fixed
costs " "' are supposed to be included in the calculation. In his AT&T
testimony, Professor Baumol assumed that all costs were incremental
costs. 3 Baumol, Ordover, and Willig, state that incremental costs include
"the requisite capital," without defining what that means. "
4
Baumol and Sidak address the ambiguity of how to treat the incumbent's
fixed and sunk costs with the following cryptic statement: "Despite these
possible distinctions, readers will lose little in following the logic in the
remainder of our discussion if they treat average-incremental cost and average-
variable cost as synonyms.""' Given the fact that most of the incumbent's
costs of the local loop are likely to be "product specific fixed (sunk) costs,"
this problem cannot merely be assumed away.
D. The Threat to Technological Development
One well-known way firms compete is through technological innovation,
which ultimately renders old technologies obsolete. Where technological
innovation erodes the value of an incumbent's sunk costs, the parity principle
ensures their protection. At the same time, the parity principle may prevent
an equally efficient entrant from recovering the revenues necessary to survive.
The hypothetical railroad examples offered in Baumol and Willig's brief
submitted to the High Court do not consider the possibility of differing
services or improved technology. Rather, the goal is simply to carry railroad
traffic between two points "Y" and "Z" at minimum incremental cost. Once
110. Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 177-79.
111. Id. at 177.
112. Id.
113. Baumol AT&T Testimony, supra note 17, at 16.
114. Baumol et al., supra note 12, at 10 ("The analysis underlying the parity principle
... tells us that the price that the bottleneck-owner firm charges itself for bottleneck input is
simply the price the firm charges to the final-product customer, minus the incremental cost to that
firm of the final product, including the requisite capital.").
115. Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 177.
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the prospects for new technology and different services are introduced,
however, several defects of the parity principle become apparent. The parity
principle reduces the benefits of new technology to consumers and can deter
entrants from introducing new technology altogether.
We introduce the possibility of divergent technologies to the typical
hypothetical examples concerning the parity principle. The incumbent has an
older technology that is both low in performance and low in incremental cost.
Figure 5 converts the rail example into a message delivery service and assumes
the incumbent can deliver a particular document by mail at an incremental cost
of $3. Delivery takes several days. The proposed entrant has access to fax
technology that can deliver the message instantaneously, but at an incremental
cost of $4. Because different services are involved, a simple comparison of
incremental costs does not tell which technology is more efficient.
A dynamic analysis reveals how the parity principle will impede efficient
new technology altogether if any significant risks are involved in its
introduction. Most technological innovations involve risk of one sort or
another; it is not known whether the market will bear a sufficiently attractive
combination of price and volume to cover the costs of the new technology.
Failure occurs when the new technology cannot command sufficient revenues
to cover its costs. The entrant will introduce the new technology only if the
expected gains in the event of success more than offset the expected losses in
the case of failure. Risky new technology will never be introduced under the
parity principle because the incumbent can confiscate the entrant's benefits
under the successful scenario. The incumbent can always constrain the entrant
to receiving revenues no more than enough to cover incremental costs. Facing
no upside in the successful scenario and a prospect of losses in case of failure,
the rational entrant will avoid innovation and stay with established
technologies.
Figure 5 illustrates the risk/reward imbalance created by the parity
principle in the introduction of new technology. Prior to the introduction of
new technology, the incumbent charges $10 for the service and incurs an
incremental cost of $3 over the competitive service and charges $7 for access.
If the fax technology proves successful, it will command a premium price of
$13 for the entire service with incremental costs of only $4. If it fails, it
cannot compete with the $10 price of the old technology and the entrant exits
the market at a loss of investment. If the price of access were constant at $7,
the successful entrant would retain benefits of $2 ($13 - $4 - $7 = $2). We
assume that the $2 more than compensates the innovator for risk of loss of his
investment.
Witnessing the success of the technology, however, the bottleneck carrier
can now raise the access price to $9. In fact, the bottleneck carrier can be




The Parity Principle Can Impede
the Development of New Technology
Price over entire route = $10.00
Bottleneck Portion Connecting Competitive Portion
Service by Mail,
Delivery in Five Days
Bottleneck Carrier "A" Incremental Cost: $3.00
Incremental Costs: $5.50








SEntrant bears risk, charges $13 for total service.
f Risk resolved, bottleneck carrier raises access price
to $9 ($13 - $4). Entrant's benefits are therefore
eliminated.
Monopoly Pricing:
* At same $10 price as old technology, all benefits
of fax technology are passed on to consumers.
* However, new technology cannot survive.
* At "regulated" bottleneck price of $5.50, entrant can
charge $10, benefit consumers and make profit.
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bottleneck carrier will claim it could receive $13 in total revenues and incur
$4 in incremental costs if it provided the same new technology as the
entrant.11 6 Under this logic, the bottleneck carrier's total opportunity cost,
and hence the parity principle price, are $9. The entrant's profit in the event
of technological success is thus reduced to $0, with the added discouragement
of potential losses if the technology is not adopted.
It is easy to see how any successful outcome of the new technology will
lead to a bottleneck price appropriating all the entrant's benefits. Technological
progress is impeded by eliminating the prospects of benefits that are necessary
to motivate risk taking. Instead of appropriating merely sunk investment costs
the incumbent essentially appropriates the risk premium that motivated the
introduction of new technology. Once the technology has proven successful,
the risk costs are essentially "sunk" and permit an opportunistic price squeeze
just as when the more tangible fixed costs of an investment are sunk.
Proponents of the parity principle may argue that new technology will
be introduced as long as the bottleneck carrier is allowed to adopt a "make or
buy" approach. They may assert that Telecom would always have the incentive
to subcontract any technological innovation from Clear if it were indeed
valuable. As explained in detail above, proposed contractual solutions can be
unstable and the parity principle itself can be used to undermine them. The
only alternative to contractual solutions is to rely upon the incumbent alone
for technological progress. However, economic theory shows that dominant
incumbents can have reduced incentives to introduce new technology."
7
Furthermore, experience has shown the important role of new entrants and
competition in motivating technological progress. Fundamentally, the make or
buy analogy ignores Clear's desire to become a competitor as opposed to a
supplier.
Even under a purely static analysis, the monopoly pricing permitted under
the parity principle can reduce the benefits of the new technology to
consumers. Under competition, all the benefits of the technology and the
efficiency advantages are eventually passed on to consumers. The parity
principle, by contrast, permits the incumbent to appropriate these benefits for
itself.
Assume in Figure 5 that the $10 price charged by the bottleneck carrier
for its service is a monopoly price exceeding the total costs of the service by
116. If the innovation is not patentable, access pricing can be used by the incumbent to
shorten the time and reduce the expense of duplicating the entrant's innovation. Under ordinary
circumstances, the incumbent can raise the price of access faster than it can respond competitively,
thus eliminating the lag which the entrant would rely upon for recovery of development expenses.
For patentable innovations, the protection afforded by the patent is vastly undercut by the prospect
that the bottleneck owner will raise the price of access to appropriate the benefits.
117. See ITS Paper, supra note t, app. A.
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$1.50. The parity principle extends this $1.50 monopoly profit to the new
technology as well. Customers would receive all the relative benefits of the
new technology if the entrant charged the same $10 for the entire service.
However, this is not sustainable because the $7 access fee renders the
technology unprofitable if the entrant charges the same price as that of the old
technology.
The opportunity costs under the parity principle can be viewed as a tax
on new technology collected by the monopolist. Figure 5 shows true
incremental costs of the entire fax technology of only $9.50, ($5.50 for the
bottleneck services plus $4 for the fax), yet the new technology must be able
to sustain a price of $11. That is, the new technology must have sufficient
benefits to compensate for both its higher incremental costs and for the $1.50
in monopoly profits of the incumbent. The consumers only receive the residual
benefit above and beyond this tax. Under a regulated price of $5.50 based on
the incremental cost of access, the incentives for introduction of the technology
are greater: the new technology can survive, earn a profit for the entrant and
pass along benefits to consumers at a $10 price for the entire service.
The result is the same even if the new technology generates new business.
Baumol and Sidak paint a more benign picture of the parity principle by
arguing that incremental business volume generated by the entrant is not an
opportunity cost: "[An entering IXC [inter-exchange carrier] is likely to
devote effort to expanding the market, using the access to serve at least some
new business that entails no reduction in LEC (local exchange carrier) volume,
and may even bring a bit of additional traffic to the LEC. In that case, the
pertinent opportunity cost to the LEC of the supply of access will be lower
than if the added IXC volume is added directly and fully at the expense of
LEC sales." 11 However, if the innovation is not patented, the incumbent can
always argue it would have introduced the new technology if the entrant had
not. Any new business stimulated by the technology can therefore be recast
as a true opportunity cost subject to the parity principle (see discussion above
regarding appropriation of efficiency gains). Instead of the "make or buy"
decision, the incumbent will argue it "could have made" the technology and
therefore should be allowed to "buy" it at a price equivalent to the incremental
costs of the entrant.
Kahn and Taylor have characterized many of the dynamic objections to
the parity principle as "infant industry" arguments." 9 Perhaps many infant
industry arguments have been raised in other contexts, but the above examples
are not among them. The examples assume the new technology has a higher
incremental cost, but can command correspondingly higher prices. The
118. Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 197.
119. Kahn & Taylor, supra note 19, at 232-35.
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examples show how the threat of opportunism can stifle new technology and
how the possibility of monopoly profits under the parity principle can channel
the benefits of new technology disproportionately to the incumbent, even
though the entrant introduces the technology.
III. The Interconnection Dispute Between Clear and Telecom
A. Procedural History
In a move designed to direct the telecommunications industry away from
monopoly control, the New Zealand government opened the network
telecommunications market to competition on April 1, 1989.120 Prior to that,
Telecom had been a protected state-owned monopoly providing local exchange
and interexchange toll service throughout New Zealand.' In September
1990, state ownership of Telecom was dissolved when the Government sold
shares in Telecom's assets to a consortium of private investors that included
Bell Atlantic, Ameritech, Freightways Holdings Limited and Fay Richwhite
Holdings Limited.122 One share was retained by the Minister of Finance on
behalf of the Government. This share, the Kiwi Share, ensures the right of the
Government to obligate Telecom to certain service provisions (the "Kiwi Share
Obligation"). It caps standard residential rental increases to the rate of inflation
as long as Telecom's profitability is not unreasonably impaired.'"
Consistent with the Government's desire for competition in the supply
of telecommunications services, other providers have either entered or have
declared their intent to enter the market. In October 1990, Clear
Communications Ltd. was declared a network operator under the
Telecommunications Act of 1987.24 Subsequently, Clear entered the market
for toll services and has been successful in competing with Telecom in these
markets. Clear quickly garnered ten percent of the long distance toll market.
More recently, Clear's market share growth has slowed down, although as of
1995 it had some twenty-two percent of the toll market. Bell South also entered
the New Zealand telecommunications market with cellular technology.
Clear also sought to enter the market for competitive local telephone
service. Clear intended to serve principally business customers in the Central
Business Districts ("CBDs") of the larger New Zealand cities, although Clear
is not restricting itself to this market. Clear is in direct competition with
120. Telecom Corp. of N.Z. v. Clear Communications, Ltd., [1992] 5 T.C.L.R. 166, 170
(H.C.), rev'd, [1993] 4 N.Z.B.L.C. 340 (C.A.), rev'd, [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385 (P.C.).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 169.
123. Id. at 183.
124. Id. at 170.
Vol. 13:419, 1996
New Zealand Telecommunications
Telecom, the incumbent local exchange carrier ("LEC"). Clear's network
offers a number of services different from those currently provided by
Telecom, including a service called "Gateway." This is a "Centrex" type
service especially designed for large volume users, which makes it distinctive
from Telecom's competing product offering.
To ensure ubiquity in local service, Clear sought an interconnection
agreement with Telecom. In New Zealand, neither the rates charged consumers
nor those charged other telecommunications networks for interconnection to
the Public Switched Telephone Network ("PSTN") are immediately subject
to regulatory oversight."z A breakdown in negotiations between the parties
resulted in litigation over the price of interconnection to the PSTN. Clear sued
Telecom under New Zealand's antitrust statute, section 36 of the Commerce
Act of 1986. Section 36(1) of the Commerce Act provides:
No person who has a dominant position in a market shall use that
position for the purpose of (a) Restricting the entry of any person
into that or any other market; or (b) Preventing or deterring any
person from engaging in competitive conduct in that or in any other
market; or (c) Eliminating any person from that or any other
market. "6
In response, Telecom retained Professors Baumol and Willig and revised its
interconnection proposal to conform with the parity principle.
Judge Ellis and Professor M. Brunt of the Wellington Registry of the
High Court of New Zealand (the trial court) recognized that Telecom's
characterization of Clear's operations as a large Private Automatic Branch
Exchange ("PABX") was an "essential feature" of Telecom's refusal to
recognize Clear "as a network competitor". 27 However, they found that
Telecom's proposed "parity principle" was not in violation of section 36(1),
although Telecom's prior actions were. 28 The Court of Appeal of New
Zealand reversed, on the grounds that Telecom's proposed pricing rule would
violate section 36 because the price of interconnection would include monopoly
rents and insulate Telecom from any adverse consequences of entry.'29 The
Court of Appeal also determined that Telecom's pricing rule was incompatible
125. However, price control may be invoked by the Government under Part IV of the
Commerce Act of 1986. Commerce Act, No. 5, § 36, 1986 N.Z. Stat. 71 (1986).
126. § 36(1), 1986 N.Z. Stat. at 95.
127. Telecom Corp. of N.Z. v. Clear Communications, Ltd., [1992] 5 T.C.L.R. 166, 176
(H.C.), rev'd, [1993] 4 N.Z.B.L.C. 340 (C.A.), rev'd, [19951 1 N.Z.L.R. 385 (P.C.).
128. Id. at 218-20.
129. "I cannot accept a[s] appropriate pricing that would cement in any monopoly profits
.... Inclusion in any access levy of a monopoly profit component must affect the price at which
Clear can enter the market and so affect the vigour of its competitive conduct." Id. at 358.
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with "light-handed regulation." 13°
Shortly thereafter, Baumol and Sidak published an article that
"sympathized" with the Court of Appeal's rejection of the parity principle.
They agreed that the parity principle itself could not solve the monopoly rents
problem. Rather, the parity principle relied upon regulation of the end-price
to prevent monopoly profits, and such regulation was absent from New
Zealand. "It is therefore understandable that the Court of Appeal ordered Clear
and Telecom to renew negotiations to set an access price that excluded any
monopoly profit foregone by Telecom. " "'
The Court of Appeal, however, was subsequently overturned by the
Judgment of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,
delivered on 19 October 1994.132 The Privy Council attempted to separate
the issue of monopoly rents from that of abusive conduct. Aside from the
monopoly rents objection, it believed the parity principle could not be deemed
abusive. It read Section 36 more narrowly than the Court of Appeal and
relegated the monopoly rents issue to Part IV of the Commerce Act.
133
Under this interpretation, Telecom's proposed pricing rule could not violate
section 36 even if it indemnified the incumbent for the financial consequences
of entry. '34
Telecommunication services to customers in New Zealand are almost
completely deregulated and there is little support for instituting any formal
reregulation. 135 All parties preferred a negotiated contractual solution to the
problem, 36 but some sort of government policy direction was required. 37
130. Id. at 359.
131. Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 195.
132. Telecom, [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385, rev'g [1993] 4 N.Z.L.B.C. 340 (C.A.).
133. "The Court of Appeal took the view that s[ection] 36 had the wider purpose, beyond
producing fair competition, of eliminating monopoly profits currently obtained by the person in
the dominant market position. Their Lordships do not agree." Id. at 407.
134. The reasoning of the Privy Council was as follows:
The principal question remains, as it always was, whether the actual or potential
presence of monopoly rents vitiates the validity of the Baumol-Willig model for the
purposes of s[ection] 36. . . . Their Lordships are of the view that, apart from the
risk of monopoly rents, the Baumol-Willig Rule does provide a proper model for
demonstrating what would be charged by the hypothetical supplier in a perfectly
contestable market. . . .It follows that the risk of monopoly rents has no bearing
upon the question whether the application of the Baumol-Willig Rule prevents
competition in the contested area. If both Telecom and Clear are charging their
customers the same amount in the area in which they are not competitors (i.e. point
alpha [the point where Clear's network joins Telecom's] onwards) this does not have
any effect on their relative competitiveness in the area in which they compete (i.e.
up to point alpha).
Id. at 405, 407 (emphasis added).
135. Nor have the Courts expressed any appetite for setting prices. "We are not a price
fixing authority." Telecom, [1993] 4 N.Z.L.B.C. at 344.
136. HON. MAURICE WILLIAMSON (MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS) & HON. PHILLIP




Until the government report questioning the efficacy of the Baumol-Willig rule,
private negotiations without a framework other than section 36 had proven
fruitless; each party remained exposed to opportunistic behavior by the other.
The central dilemma was therefore to determine the terms of interconnection
that would best enhance competition and efficiency consistent with the
government's preference for effective competition with minimal regulatory
intervention. 3 '
In a recent edition of this Journal, William J. Baumol and Gregory
Sidak 39 sought to resolve supposed misunderstandings about their position
and report on more recent developments in the litigation between Clear
Communications and Telecom of New Zealand over competitive access in
telecommunications in New Zealand. At the time of the Privy Council
decision, it appeared that the issue had been resolved in favor of a total victory
for what Baumol and Sidak call the Efficient Component Pricing Rule
("ECPR" or the "Baumol-Willig (BW) Rule" as it came to be known in New
Zealand).
However, the Privy Council's decision created immediate concern over
the implications for a successful transition to competition and demands that
these be addressed by direct government action. On November 4, 1994, the
Minister of Communications and the Minister of Commerce of New Zealand
announced:
The Government has instructed officials to examine the public
policy implications of the Privy Council judgment on the local
access interconnection case between Telecom and Clear
Communications ...
... The Ministers say this examination would cover both the
implication of the Baumol-Willig pricing rule for interconnection
in telecommunications and the wider implications of the Privy
Council's judgment on section 36 of the Commerce Act.
• . . The Government is keen to ensure that the dynamic
benefits of competition continue to develop to the advantage of
INTERCONNECTION (Nov. 9, 1994) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON & BURDON NEWS RELEASE] ("The
Ministers emphasize their expectation that parties should resume negotiations.")
137. The High Court noted that "[i]f the Baumol-Willig Rule is implemented there would
be a need for careful design of the administrative mechanism. Regular reviews would be necessary
to adjust for shifting prices and costs." Telecom Corp. of N.Z. v. Clear Communications, Ltd.,
[1992] 5 T.C.L.R. 166, 216 (H.C.), rev'd, [1993] 4 N.Z.B.L.C. 340 (C.A.), rev'd, [1995] 1
N.Z.L.R. 385 (P.C.).
138. See [1993] 4 N.Z.B.L.C. at 345 (Gault, J., concurring) (quoting Dec. 1991
Government Policy Statement).
139. Baumol & Sidak, supra note 17.
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In August 1995, the Ministry of Commerce and the Treasury of New
Zealand issued a preliminary report based on that inquiry. 14' In it, the
government expressed major reservations about the use of the ECPR as a
regulatory and legal principle during a successful transition to deregulation:
1. ECPR assumes that the only competitive problem is to prevent
uneconomic entry in a regulatory regime where prices to end
users are set optimally by regulators;
42
2. However, in a regime of effective competition for service to
end users, inefficient entry will not be a problem if access
prices are simply established at competitive levels;'43
3. Cross-subsidies to achieve universal service should be
separated from the problem of establishing competitive access
prices and the subsidy mechanism should be competitively
140. WILLIAMSON & BURDON NEWS RELEASE, supra note 136 (emphasis added).
141. N.Z. MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & TREASURY OF N.Z., REGULATION OF ACCESS TO
VERTICALLY-INTEGRATED NATURAL MONOPOLIES (1995) [hereinafter August 1995 Report].
142. The August 1995 Report noted that "[t]he BW rule originated in a regulatory context
in which the final prices of the monopolist are controlled. In this context (putting aside for the
moment any dynamic benefits of competition) economically efficient interconnection pricing can
be achieved solely by ensuring that inefficient firms do not enter the market." Id. at 2.
The government went on to note that:
The BW rule is designed to be applied to monopolies where both final product price
and the intermediate access or interconnection price are regulated.
... In this context, provided the regulator is doing its job, the final product
prices will be set efficiently. There is no need to rely upon competition to achieve
this goal. Given that allocative efficiency has been achieved by other means, a
primary remaining goal for the interconnection pricing rule is productive efficiency.
Putting aside complications such as sunk costs, uncertainty and dynamic effects from
competition, productive efficiency can be achieved by simply ensuring that
inefficient firms are not able to successfully enter the market. The BW rule achieves
this goal of keeping inefficient firms out of the market.
Id. at 28.
143. The August 1995 Report stated that:
However, if the downstream market can support more than a few firms, the normal
forces of competition can be relied upon to drive inefficient firms out of the market.
Moreover, in a context in which final prices are not regulated, the BW rule will not
restrain the ability of the monopolist to charge monopoly rents on the natural
monopoly portion of the business.
Id. at 2 (emphasis added). The government went on to note that: "The undesirable effects of
regulation may be kept to a minimum by limiting regulation to the natural monopoly facility and
allowing competitive pressures to discipline the monopolist in the up- or downstream market."
Id. at 5. The report concluded that government's policy fits within the general category of "price





4. Cost-based rules may be superior to ECPR in establishing
competitive access prices;145
5. Contrary to the teachings of ECPR, there is no one access
pricing rule that fits all situations; I
6. ECPR fails to consider the consequences of sunk costs and the
dynamic benefits of competition;
47
144. The August 1995 Report stated that:
In the case of telecommunications, it may not be possible to choose the
interconnection pricing rule in such a way as to achieve both the goal of economic
efficiency and the goal of efficient handling of the cost of a social obligation (such
as the Kiwi Share). Therefore, these two goals are separated. The question of the
economically efficient access pricing rule in the absence of the social obligation is
considered first, followed by the question of the efficient method of handling the
social obligation itself.
Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The report went on to note that:
A method of handling social obligations should, primarily, seek to promote
economic efficiency. In this context economic efficiency is promoted by estimating
and allocating the costs of the obligation amongst the parties in such a way as to
minimise the overall economic distortions created by the obligation. In particular,
this will involve allocating the costs of the obligation in such a way that no firm is
given a competitive advantage or disadvantage.
Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
145. The August 1995 Report noted that "[clertain of these pricing rules, such as the 'cost-
based rules'in options (a) [pricing at short-run or long-run marginal cost] and (b) [pricing at long-
run average incremental costs].. . may do better than the BW rule at achieving both of the goals
of productive and allocative efficiency." Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
146. The August 1995 Report stated that:
The appropriate access price in any given circumstance will depend upon a large
number of factors including the information available to the regulator, the cost
structure of the monopoly firm and whether or not the monopoly facility is likely
to be capacity constrained. The most appropriate rule in any given context will
depend upon the factors specific to the industry and the nature of the access problem
involved.
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
147. The August 1995 Report further stated that:
In these simple examples, the BW rule achieves the goal of permitting entry if and
only if the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent. However, if
we consider slightly more complicated models this is no longer the case.
... The BW rule may, in fact, block efficient entry in those industries where
entry involves large sunk costs (e.g., telecommunications). The presence of large
sunk costs and uncertainty about the future has the combined effect of deterring
entry unless the expected returns exceed the required return on capital. The
additional required return effectively raises the 'hurdle' that a potential entrant must
overcome for entry to be worthwhile. An interconnection price set according to the
BW rule will therefore deter some efficient entry.
... Furthermore, the BW rule may fail to achieve productive efficiency for
another reason: the BW rule fails to take into account the dynamic benefits of
competition. Competition in itself, can be expected to yield productive efficiency
benefits.
... Therefore, even in the context for which the BW rule was designed, a
slightly lower access price may promote economic well-being in certain
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7. All these considerations raise serious questions about the
applicability of ECPR to the situation in New Zealand.1
48
Very shortly after the issuance of the New Zealand government report
criticizing the Baumol-Willig rule, Clear and Telecom announced that the
litigation had been settled and that an agreement on interconnection pricing had
been reached. 49 Although the pertinent litigation in New Zealand is now
over, the issues raised by this debate are extremely current both in the United
States and around the world. 50 It is not clear what policies the New Zealand
government would apply to future interconnection disputes, either between
Clear and Telecom or with other potential entrants. Furthermore, the Privy
Council decision has implications for a host of countries attempting to
introduce competition in telecommunications. It has legal relevance for
Commonwealth countries subject to the jurisdiction of the Privy Council, even
though the experts upon whom the Privy Council relied have since questioned
much of its economic logic, if not the opinion itself.
B. The Errors of the High Court and Privy Council
The High Court and the Privy Council addressed arguments that the
parity principle would perpetuate monopoly profits. Although an equally
efficient competitor cannot lower the prices to customers under the parity
principle, the High Court and the Privy Council speculated that an entrant with
efficiency advantages relative to Telecom would be able to do so. The Court
of Appeal remarked:
circumstances.
Id. at 29 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
148. The August 1995 Report stated:
To summarize, the BW rule was solely designed to achieve the goal of productive
efficiency. In the simplest, static and no-uncertainty contexts the rule achieves this
goal. However, if other factors are introduced, such as uncertainty and sunk costs,
or if the dynamic benefits of competition are considered, the BW rule may, in fact,
deter efficient entry.
. . . Together [this and other] considerations raise concerns about the
appropriateness of the BW rule for pricing interconnection in the New Zealand
regulatory environment.
Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
149. TELECOM CORP. OF N.Z. & CLEAR COMMUNICATIONS, CLEAR AND TELECOM REACH
INTERCONNECTION HEADS OF AGREEMENT (Sept. 6, 1995).
150. See, e.g., Alexander C. Larson et al., Competitive Access Issues and
Telecommunications Regulatory Policy, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 419 (1994); Daniel F. Spulber,
Deregulating Telecommunications, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 25 (1995); Symposium, Recent
Competition Issues in Telecommunications, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 455 (1995); John J. Keller,
AT&T Targets Home Markets of Baby Bells. Division with Five Regions Will Coordinate Assault




The argument for Telecom, skillfully put by counsel and witnesses
and largely accepted by the High Court, is that the difficulty is
overcome because, if Clear is more efficient than Telecom, Clear
will be able to attract business by charging its customers less: hence
Telecom in its turn will have to charge its customers less, to remain
competitive: hence the 'opportunity cost'for which Telecom is to
be compensated will fall."5'
While the Court of Appeal rejected this logic, the Privy Council accepted
it fully.' 52 Indeed, the Privy Council went so far as to say: "It is to be noted
that it has not been established by Clear (nor can it be regarded as a serious
risk) that Telecom's charges will be so high that Clear will be unable to enter
the CBD market at all."
53
Based on the testimony of proponents of the parity principle in the New
Zealand litigation, the Privy Council reasoned that there would be competition
on equal terms in the "contested area," i.e., the part of the market where
151. Telecom Corp. of N.Z. v. Clear Communications, Ltd., [1993] 4 N.Z.B.L.C. 340,
343 (C.A.) (emphasis added), rev'd, [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385 (P.C.). The Court of Appeal also
clearly stated that Baumol and Willig's brief to the High Court stood for the proposition that
competition under the parity principle would erode monopoly profits:
Professor Baumol reconciled his rule with economic efficiency and the objectives
of competition law by reliance upon the dynamics of the competitive process. He
said that to counter Clear's entry into the market Telecom, if enjoying monopoly
profits, would lower its prices. The amount of the reduction would no longer
represent lost opportunity and so the charges to Clear would be reduced. This
process would continue until any monopoly profits were competed away.
Id. at 357.
152. The Privy Council was clearly led to believe that monopoly profits would not be a
problem under the parity principle as applied in New Zealand (where there is no price regulation
of the monopolist):
[T]he Rule envisages that if Clear is the more efficient provider of the service to
point alpha it will be able to charge less for calls for this sector, thereby
undercutting Telecom's price for the totality of the call. This competition in the
contested area, it is said, will force Telecom to reduce its prices, thereby diminishing
its opportunity costs and correspondingly diminishing the amount of the access levy
it can charge to Clear. This process offorcing down the price charged by Telecom
to Clear will continue until any element of monopoly profit is "competed out" of
Telecom's charges.
... But it [Telecom] is not acting uncompetitively in charging its opportunity cost
since that is what it would have charged in a fully competitive market.
... The superior efficiency of one or the other in the only sector in which Clear
has chosen to compete (local services for business users in CBDs [Central Business
Districts]) will dictate commercial success in that area. The High Court was satisfied
that such competition would occur and that as a result any monopoly profits would
be competed out.
Telecom Corp. of N.Z. v. Clear Communications, Ltd., [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385, 397, 406, 407
(P.C.).
153. Id. at 407 (emphasis added).
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entrants such as Clear would seek to compete.' 54 The Privy Council in fact
ruled that the existence of monopoly profits was irrelevant to the issue of
competition on equal terms:
It follows that the risk of monopoly rents has no bearing upon the
question whether the application of the Baumol-Willig Rule
prevents competition in the contested area. If both [emphasis in
original] Telecom and Clear are charging their customers the same
amount in the area in which they are not competitors (i.e. point
alpha onwards) this does not have any effect on their relative
competitiveness in the area in which they compete (i.e. up to point
alpha). '
In short, the Privy Council concluded that the parity principle is a
necessary and sufficient condition for competition on equal terms, regardless
of what the final price to the consumer happens to be. 56 However, there is
a clear emerging consensus that competitors are not treated symmetrically
under the parity principle.' 57
154. The Privy Council relied heavily upon Baumol and Willig's brief to the High Court
to conclude that Clear and Telecom would be on a "level playing field" under the parity principle,
even if the price of interconnection contained monopoly profits:
Professor Baumol accepted that this model enabled Telecom to secure, by way of
payment from Clear, the continued receipt of any monopoly rents present in its
existing charging rents .... Professor Baumol did not regard the possible presence
of monopoly rents in the charges levied by Telecom on Clear as invalidating his
model. . . .[P]rovided that Telecom also charged its customers on the same basis,
there was a level playing field in the area in which Telecom and Clear would
compete .... [I]f both Telecom and Clear (and therefore indirectly their respective
customers) were charged the same amount for use of the rest of the PSTN, in the
area in which they were competing they would be competing on equal terms
whatever the amount charged. Clear could compete in the contested area on equal
terms.
Id. at 395-96 (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 396 (emphasis added). "The High Court usefully defined the point at which
Clear's network joins Telecom's PSTN as 'point alpha."' Id.
156. This claim is made more recently by Baumol et al.
The parity price for a bottleneck input is both necessary and sufficient in order for
the playing field to be level, i.e., for the maximum difference between the
remunerative prices of the perfect-substitute final-products of the two firms, the
bottleneck-input provider (B) and its final-product competitor (C), to be exactly
equal to the difference in their incremental costs for the remaining input portions
of their competing final product supply.
Supra note 12, at 11.
157. Professor Baumol more recently explicitly rejected the Privy Council's conclusions
that monopoly profits are irrelevant and that the parity principle creates a "level playing field":
Under a scenario entailing monopoly earnings on the provision of access to the
interexchange carriers, along with an imputation policy that precludes price
discrimination by the LEC [the parity principle], the parity principle will not really
treat the LECs and the IXCs evenhandedly. The former will be guaranteed a
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The Privy Council's belief that competition will erode monopoly profits
under the parity principle is mistaken. If the monopolist is indemnified by the
parity principle against the results of competition, and if "opportunity cost"
is defined to include monopoly rents, no amount of competition from the firm
seeking access can purge the access price of monopoly rents. 5 ' The
efficiency advantages of an entrant, rather than eroding the monopoly rents
of the incumbent, simply generate the temptation to increase the access price.
Increases in the access price are permitted under the parity principle as long
as the end price is increased correspondingly. Complementary rules would be
required to avoid this danger.
We also point out an inconsistency that appears to have escaped the notice
of the Privy Council. The parity principle was alleged to preserve the
indifference of the incumbent to entry. The argument that a hypothetically
more efficient entrant could lower the final price to consumers, however,
assumed a competitive threat. Under the parity principle, the Privy Council
reasoned "if Clear competed successfully in the contested area at a lower price
to its customers, Telecom would be forced to reduce its prices to
customers. "
159
However, recall the demonstration of the incumbent's indifference to
cooperation with the entrant. In Figure 1, the same example offered by
proponents of the parity principle, the incumbent's indifference is preserved
no matter what the entrant chooses to charge as a final price to consumers. In
fact, the entrant could simply give away the service to consumers for free and
the incumbent would be no worse off than when it charged the full $10 price
and handled the business independently. The incumbent would still receive the
$7 access charge and avoid the $3 in incremental costs over the competitive
segment. The notion that Telecom would be forced to reduce prices in an
monopoly profit, while the latter will be prevented from earning more than zero
economic profit from their toll service if they are just as efficient as the LEC.
... The price of access under the parity principle is clearly extremely
generous to the LEC, because it permits the owner of the facilities, in this case the
LEC, to earn from the access user a profit equal to the full profit that the LEC earns
on the bundled combination of access and message transport when it sells the final
toll-service product to the ultimate customer. In other words, it offers the LEC a
profit on access alone, when sold to an IXC equal to the profit the LEC earns on
the two services of access and transport together, when it itself supplies final
product.
Baumol AT&T Testimony, supra note 17, at 18-19 (emphasis added).
Professor Kahn has also rebutted the misconception that the entrant and monopolist are
treated symmetrically: "The treatment under our rules of the incumbent telephone company and
its would-be rivals is indeed asymmetrical. The justification is that the former are and have been
thoroughly regulated public utility enterprises." Kahn & Taylor, supra note 19, at 236.
158. Baumol AT&T Testimony, supra note 17, at 4-5, 17-18; see also Baumol & Sidak,
supra note 6.
159. [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 396 (emphasis added).
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attempt to attract traffic back from Clear contradicts the parity principle's
fundamental test of indifference. In Figure 2, we demonstrated that the
incumbent would prefer to simply channel the traffic to a more efficient entrant
and raise the access price. Even if this reality was never suggested to the
courts, they had sufficient basis to note the tension between simultaneous
claims of indifference (when the parity principle was alleged to achieve
efficiency) and competitive response (when monopoly profits were supposed
to erode).
The Privy Council relied upon testimony by Professors Baumol and
Willig that any attempt to correct even admitted problems with the parity
principle by reducing the price of interconnection would inevitably lead to
economic inefficiency. Opportunity costs must be defined in terms of
incremental revenue "that this foregone sale would otherwise have brought to
Telecom New Zealand,"160 not some other theoretically perfect price to the
customer. They were very clear on this point and repeated it twice in their
brief to the High Court. Because understanding this point is critical to the
entire current debate over the parity principle, we quote at length the Court's
rationale:
This completes the analysis of the efficiency role of the component
pricing principle. We have now seen that its working is perfectly
general. It always assigns the supplier's task to the firm that can
do it most efficiently, and a lower price than that set in accordance
with the principle (as can result if prices are set on an arbitrary
basis) is always an invitation to an interfirm cross-subsidy and the
assumption of the supplier's role by a firm that is not the most
efficient provider. This result should really not come as a surprise.
... . Requiring that component pricing deviate from the
competitive market standard, and from the equivalent efficiency
principle, even for reasons that are well-intended (e.g., if it were
thought that the opportunity costs reflected misguided company
policies), would nonetheless be incorrect. Component prices forced
below the sum of incremental and opportunity costs, as we have
shown, can lead to entry that raises social costs, without creating
more efficient supply of the components at issue. The result would
inevitably be the creation of new inefficiencies and new distorted
incentives that harm consumers and the public interest."16
The theory of the parity principle may be the first instance in the history
160. Baumol & Willig, supra note 1, at 23.
161. Id. at 35, 37 (emphasis added).
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of economic thought that any competitor paying less than a full monopoly price
for a vital raw material for its business has been deemed to receive an
"interfirm cross-subsidy."' 62 Nevertheless, based on these concerns, the
Privy Council fully accepted the logic that the parity principle should be
followed even if it meant charging monopoly prices to competing carriers and
the general public.163 It did so because proponents of the parity principle
162. Id. at 35; see also Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 179.
163. The Privy Council reasoned that:
[I]f the price charged by Telecom to Clear for use of the PSTN was less than the
component price charged by Telecom to its own customers, this would tend to
produce inefficiency in the competition in the contested area. The aim of competition
is to produce for the customer the most efficient system of supply in the contested
area. If Clear is not charged the same amount for the use of the PSTN as Telecom
is charging itself (and therefore its customers) then Clear can be less efficient than
Telecom in the contested area (i.e. the provision of the local service to customers)
and still undercut Telecom's prices for a similar service.
[1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 396 (emphasis added).
More recently, however, Professor Baumol has disputed this logic and asserted that it is
appropriate to reduce the price of access if it is inflated by monopoly profits. See also Baumol
& Sidak, supra note 6, at 195. In his testimony on behalf of AT&T, Professor Baumol appears
to recommend pricing below the levels called for by the parity principle, if such is required:
There is a way that will deal effectively with the problem [that "the parity principle
by itself does nothing to eliminate such monopoly profits"]. This simply requires
the LEC to price access at the incremental cost it incurs in supplying that access
plus no more than a reasonable contribution to coverage of the RBOC's [Regional
Bell Operating Company's] fixed and common costs. Here, it should be noted,
however, that this incremental cost must include the appropriate return to the LEC's
investment in access.
Baumol AT&T Testimony, supra note 17, at 18 (second emphasis added).
The exact meaning of this proposal depends on the meaning given by Professor Baumol
to "the incremental cost it incurs in supplying that access," a "reasonable contribution to the
RBOC's fixed and common costs," and the "appropriate return to the LEC's investment in
access." Each of these is a potential code word for reinserting monopoly-inflated opportunity costs
into the price of interconnection, on top of true incremental costs.
Considerable ambiguity has been created by the multiple meanings given to "incremental
cost" in various testimony and writings. If in Professor Baumol's above proposal, "incremental
cost" refers to "direct" incremental cost, then it would represent a major departure from the parity
principle because the starting point for pricing interconnection would not include opportunity costs.
See Baumol & Willig, supra note 1, at 26 (defining "direct" incremental costs). If "incremental
cost" means "full" incremental cost, however, Professor Baumol's proposal on behalf of AT&T
would make no sense as a means of purging the price of access of monopoly profits. Id. at 25
(defining "full" incremental costs). Certainly, such a meaning of "incremental" cost would do
nothing to purge the price of interconnection of the offending monopoly profits.
Furthermore, if he means "direct" incremental cost, Professor Baumol's proposal is similar
to that made by Clear in its recent response to Telecom's offer. Clear proposed as its pricing rule
that "Charges should be based on average incremental costs plus a reasonable contribution to the
fixed and common cost of the network." CLEAR COMMUNICATIONS, LTD., NEW ZEALANDERS
CONTINUE TO MISS OUT (Mar. 9, 1995). Professor Baumol's AT&T testimony may well also
represent a proposal by Professor Baumol to conform to the Judgment of Cooke, with which he
concurred in his article in the Yale Journal on Regulation. That Judgment called for the following:
The most that can be done is to state a principle, which can only be that Telecom
is entitled to a fair commercial return for granting Clear use of the network assets,
without regard to the present monopoly. This means that opportunity cost should
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convinced the Privy Council that pricing by use of opportunity costs computed
at existing prices was a necessary and sufficient condition for static economic
efficiency, even in the second-best world where monopoly pricing of the
service to the final customer prevailed.
It is simply untrue that departures from the parity principle as proposed
for New Zealand inevitably lead to static inefficiency in the supply of service
in the contested markets. It only happens in these hypothetical examples
because the examples ignore the availability of the bottleneck service at a
competitive price and the ensuing competition in the supply of the contested
service. Rather, the hypothetical examples assume implicitly that the
monopolist continues to charge monopoly prices. But of course the reason for
opening up competitive access was precisely to cause prices to move to
competitive levels.
Curiously, proponents of the parity principle entertained the idea of
flexible end prices only when they presented testimony on the possibility of
a more efficient entrant eroding monopoly profits. We believe this testimony
was mistaken and also note that the alternative assumption of rigid end prices
was critical to their efficiency claims. Unfortunately, the court accepted both
arguments without noticing the switch in underlying assumptions.
The High Court specifically addressed concerns that the parity principle
was required to prevent inefficiency in light of the KSO."' Telecom had
sought compensation for the alleged burden of the Kiwi Share Obligation in
negotiations with Clear. The KSO prevents monthly residential charges from
increasing faster than the rate of inflation, and ensures unlimited free local
calls.
Telecom frequently described the KSO as a "burden" but did not
substantiate this claim. To the contrary, Dr. Troughton, Managing Director
of Telecom, announced the profitability of Telecom's residential service. 6 '
The KSO can only be characterized as a burden if local monthly charges are
be ignored and the charge fixed on the basis of what a network owner not in
competition for the custom of subscribers could reasonably charge for use of its
facilities
Telecom Corp. of N.Z. v. Clear Communications, Ltd., [1993] 4 N.Z.B.L.C. 340, 344 (C.A.),
rev'd, [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385 (P.C.) (emphasis added).
164. Uneconomic bypass appeared to be one of the substantive reasons given by the High
Court for approving the parity principle, notwithstanding that Court's reservations. Telecom Corp.
of N.Z. v. Clear Communications, Ltd., [1992] 5 T.C.L.R. at 166, 218-20 (H.C.), rev'd, [1993]
4 N.Z.B.L.C. 340 (C.A.), rev'd, [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385 (P.C.). Concern appears to have
followed from the High Court's adoption of Professor Baumol's evidence that the rule was
necessary to enable Telecom to recover appropriate contribution to cover its universal service
burden. See id. at 212. Unless it had this protection Professor Baumol argued it could not survive
against rivals without the same burden. See High Court Transcript, supra note 41, at 758-59, 793.
165. Dr. Troughton reported: "Basically, I am making a profit out of the residential
envelope, rural and urban." [1992] 5 T.C.L.R. at 210.
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compared to the full costs of access and of local phone calls. Once long
distance revenues from residential customers are included, residential service
appears profitable. This is the comparison that delighted Dr. Troughton.
Nevertheless, Telecom appears to have adopted a negotiation stance that would
define the KSO burden within the confines of local residential access and local
charges.
The existence of a burden from the Kiwi Share Obligation is an empirical
issue and cannot be determined merely by force of statement.166 If such a
burden does exist, Telecom could have provided evidence. Telecom should
not be allowed to merely assert the existence of a burden and seek to pass
along through the interconnection price a higher charge to Clear or any other
competitor. Nor should the KSO be used under a "kitchen sink" approach to
justify indemnifying Telecom for all its revenues lost from competition.
Furthermore, Telecom can suspend the KSO if it unreasonably impairs
profitability, also inconsistent with the notion of "burden." Telecom has an
obligation to exploit the flexibility built into the KSO to mitigate any actual
burden. This must be done before Telecom attempts to pass along higher
charges to its competitors.
Telecom was privatized after the Government had opened the
telecommunications industry to competition. The investors were aware of both
the KSO and the prospect of competitive entry. They should therefore have
discounted any KSO burden in determining the share price. The KSO has not,
in reality, burdened Telecom's shareholders. Imposing a burden on Clear's
investors and on consumers would be inappropriate.
The High Court appears to have misunderstood this point. It accepted
Professor Baumol's testimony that "a distinction must be drawn between the
buyer's problem and society's problem. The KSO will impinge on future
capital replacement and pricing decisions. While the buyers may be protected,
there is still an impact on the public interest in that the existence of the KSO
can distort ongoing production and selling decision ... [B]ygones are forever
bygones. "167
However, the Kiwi Share Obligation has already been funded by a
discount on the share price and therefore requires no future price, production,
or selling distortions for further funding. No such distortion will occur if
Telecom is simply subject to competition. It may earn less of a return than
166. We have assumed for the purpose of argument that any cross subsidy is indeed a
burden on the provider. However, cellular carriers in the United States have voluntarily subsidized
the purchase of the handset, apparently in the belief that it is a profitable "loss leader." Elsewhere,
some argue that the basic line access charge should not be subsidized because the demand elasticity
for the subscriber line charge is essentially zero. See Jerry Hausman et al., The Effects of the
Breakup ofAT&Ton Telephone Penetration in the United States, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 178 (1993).
The proper balance of charges would thus appear to be an empirical matter.
167. [1992] 5 T.C.L.R. at 211.
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otherwise, but any lower ongoing return should have already been anticipated
and offset by a discount in the original share price. 68 Professor Baumol
appears to have simply assumed Telecom will have to charge in excess of
competitive charges on other services to subsidize the KSO in the future. We
disagree. To pass the KSO obligation onto competitors now would constitute
double compensation.
As discussed above, the parity principle is not required to fund the KSO
even if the government perceived a need to subsidize Telecom's obligations.
Rather, universal service obligations can be funded in a competitively neutral
manner without entering into the debate over interconnection charges. The
mere existence of a burden therefore does not provide an argument in favor
of the parity principle.
The inability of Clear to recover fixed or common costs was raised in
the litigation, but the High Court apparently believed the entrant's "rich
parents" might pick up the tab.'69 However, it provided no compelling reason
why anyone would fall into such a trap. The "rich parents" argument is no
more than a demand for an explicit cross-subsidy by the entrant with precisely
the same adverse implications for efficiency and competition that have
preoccupied the courts with respect to the Kiwi Share. Appealing to rich
parents is a demand for competition on unequal terms.
The "rich parents" issue has continued with recent suggestions in New
Zealand that Clear could pay the parity principle price and finance its local
exchange service with the savings from toll bypass. The ability to originate
and terminate toll calls within its own network may be more profitable to Clear
than paying Telecom's proposed charges under the parity principle. However,
the argument that this could subsidize local service has flaws beyond those of
the "rich parents" argument. By competing with Telecom, Clear's presence
in both the long distance and local exchange markets will align the price for
terminating and originating toll calls more closely with actual costs. Profits
from this service can therefore be expected to erode; there will be no pool of
excess profits to subsidize Clear's entry.
Kahn and Taylor believe preferential treatment of the incumbent is
justified in regulated industries based on the economics of regulatory risk and
return.170 We would agree that there are circumstances in which the
incumbent monopolist's revenues should be protected from competitive erosion.
We also believe those circumstances are inherent to traditional rate-of-return
regulation; they do not apply to the telecommunications industry in New
168. Expressed differently, the investment base on which one would calculate a price of
access purged of monopoly price would have to reflect the reduced purchase price, arrived at in
contemplation of the alleged losses in residential and rural service.
169. Id. at 216.




The privatization of Telecom exposed it to both the risks and returns of
any competitive industry. The amount paid for Telecom's assets by
shareholders was determined with full awareness of the impending competitive
regime. Any rule applying regulatory economics to establish preferential
treatment for Telecom would be inappropriate.
The Ministers of Commerce and Communications stated: "The
Government is keen to ensure that the dynamic benefits of competition continue
to develop to the advantage of users."172 The exclusive focus of the parity
principle as proposed for New Zealand on static economic efficiency ignores
entirely the dynamic benefits of competition over time. Had these arguments
prevailed in the United States, the entry of new long distance competitors into
AT&T's markets would never have been possible, because they could never
have succeeded if they had to pay twice for their investments. We have
therefore assumed the government's goal is consistent with obtaining
competition on equal terms, and that there is no legal policy to indemnify
Telecom for sunk costs incurred under the prior regime as a state enterprise
or to otherwise tilt the playing field for cost recovery in its favor.
Uneasiness remains in certain New Zealand circles that competition in
the local loop will produce a wasteful duplication of facilities that will not be
offset by strengthened incentives for cost minimization on the part of the
incumbent monopolist or the dynamic benefits of competition in achieving
technological innovation and improved service. However, prices below those
called for by the parity principle that purge monopoly profits will not create
an interfirm cross-subsidy.
The fear of wasteful duplication of facilities is closely aligned with a
belief that allowing competition on equal terms would be unfair to Telecom.
Indemnification of Telecom for revenues from its lost customers is appropriate,
according to this line of thinking, because the incumbent should be allowed
to provide the service after it has already incurred the cost. Some of this
thinking arises from a belief that one of the rights that Telecom bought from
the government was a franchise right to the customer.
There is no clear legal foundation for such beliefs. Speaking from an
economic point of view, the logic is more akin to that of a regulatory compact
171. Judge Cooke wrote:
It is important, I think, to appreciate that the theory has been developed primarily
for a country of regulated markets where prices for ultimate consumers may be
controlled by regulatory agencies. That is not the present situation in New Zealand:
the system is one of 'light-handed' regulation, the Commerce Act and competition
being relied upon to provide built-in safeguards against consumer exploitation.
Telecom Corp. of N.Z. v. Clear Communications, Ltd., [1993] 4 N.Z.L.B.C. 340, 343 (C.A.),
rev'd, [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385 (P.C.).
172. WILLIAMSON & BURDON NEWS RELEASE, supra note 136.
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than a regime of competition on equal terms. In any event, the market solution
is for competitors to protect recovery of their investments by signing contracts
with customers. Ownership of customers is antithetical to competitive markets.
Concern has also been expressed that imposing a regime of competition
on equal terms would threaten Telecom's financial stability or ability to
provide adequate service.' 7' There is no evidence that such would be the
case.
In the New Zealand litigation, it was argued that the parity principle
preserved whatever blemishes were to be found in the final price, thereby
thwarting uneconomic bypass. One of the chief virtues attributed to the rule
was that it would perpetuate the cross-subsidy alleged to be required by the
Kiwi Share Obligation. If the rule perpetuated the existing price structure,
warts and all, we were told that the parity principle was not a cure for warts.
Proponents of the rule have identified "complementary rules" necessary
to purge the parity principle of the problems that were uncovered in the New
Zealand litigation. In contrast to the New Zealand variant of parity, it is now
argued that the rule should only be applied at retail prices purged of economic
inefficiencies. 74 Rather than permit the perpetuation of the incumbent's price
structure with all its deficiencies, the argument is that access prices should be
calculated so that the incumbent will be forced to employ "imputation rules"
173. Our paper before the ITS addresses the evidence in the economic literature that
Telecom's fears are unfounded. See ITS Paper, supra note t, app. A. The New Zealand
government concluded in August 1995 that:
In preparation for deregulation, the Government commissioned a report from Touche
Ross. This report concluded that, subject to satisfactory interconnection agreements,
competition in network services was possible and sustainable and that any resultant
losses of economies of scale and scope would be small and would be outweighed
by the dynamic gains arising from greater pressures on Telecom to be efficient, to
offer better service and to be more innovative.
August 1995 Report, supra note 141, at 20. We assume this closes the matter in New Zealand
on whether competition is in the public interest.
174. William Baumol explained that:
[tihis shortcoming ... is far more serious than anything else that arises in a debate
over the finer points of ECPR and imputation .... The prices inherited from the
past have deliberately been distorted to provide very inexpensive service to
household purchasers of basic local services, with the prices of other services
inflated as a counterbalance . . . .Use of existent end-user prices, or any other
arbitrarily selected retail starting price is an indefensible basis for calculation of the
prices of basic network functions.
• .. If it is to be consistent with the requirements of the public interest,
P,-the retail price of the end-user product that includes the bottleneck facility-is
not just any retail price. It is the retail price that would be generated by a
competitive market undistorted by exercise of market power or impediments to
competition on equal terms by rivals purchasing the bottleneck facility from the
incumbent. This point is central to the analysis.
See Letter from William J. Baumol to Henry M. Davidow, Senior Attorney, AT&T (Sept. 30,
1995) 4-6 (submitted to New York State Public Service Comission by AT&T) (emphasis added)




to set retail prices in a way that the parity principle will only be achieved at
a different set of input and output prices than those previously used by the
monopolist. Alternatively, it is argued that opportunity costs should be
calculated under the assumption that the retail price is efficient. The new logic
for the parity principle is to undermine the incumbent's prevailing price
structure, not sustain it. This stands on its head the logic offered in support
of the rule in the New Zealand litigation.
At this point, however, everybody can join in the game of constraining
weak competitive neutrality with their preferred complementary rules. As they
say, "The secret's in the sauce." Each of the problems with the parity principle
we have uncovered in the previous examples could also have been cured by
an appropriate complementary rule, and each of the correct results could have
been justified as conforming with some variant of parity per se. In Figure 4,
we could have calculated an access price of $8 before costs were sunk and
imposed a complementary rule that strong competitive neutrality prevent the
recomputation of opportunity costs afterward.' 75 In Figures 2 and 5, we
could have required the incumbent to compute its opportunity cost before the
entrant revealed its efficiency gains and not change it in light of later
developments. In Figure 3, opportunity costs could have been purged of
monopoly profits via an appropriate complementary rule.
In the world where there is only one monopolist, complementary rules
can be used to correct the parity principle of its erroneous results (1) by
assuming we know the target price for the final service, (2) by choosing a
different definition and level of the relevant increment for measuring
incremental cost, and (3) by adding the complementary rule that equally
efficient competitors should have an equal opportunity for sunk cost recovery,
i.e., strong competitive neutrality. Proponents of the rule, however, have
vigorously opposed all these complementary rules at one time or another, in
favor of an implicit complementary rule that the incumbent should be
financially indemnified for the consequences of competition.
The original "Baumol-Willig" rule as proposed in New Zealand is
175. More generally, however, defining opportunity costs by use of long-run incremental
costs may not solve the problem when there are economics of scope. Baumol and Sidak remind
us of competition's need for revenues in excess of long run incremental costs:
[W]e must recall that even if every one of a firm's services is sold at a price equal
to its average-incremental cost, the firm's total revenues may not cover its total
costs. Consequently, it is normal and not anticompetitive for a firm to price some
or all of its products to provide not only the required profit component of
incremental cost, but also some contribution toward recovery of common fixed costs
that do not enter the incremental costs of the individual products.
Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 184. But this too could be cured by additional complementary
rules to allow recovery of joint and common costs by the entrant.
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evolving to what must be called parity principles. 176 To choose among them,
we are now invited to price access so that whatever opportunity cost can be
inferred from it is purged of all undesirable consequences. Of course, one
cannot object to such a rule. Any objections to a particular result only invite
supplemental constraints necessary to purge it of erroneous results. But this
rule is far different from what was offered in New Zealand and accepted by
the Privy Council.
Ultimately, weak competitive neutrality (defined as the alleged static
efficiency properties of parity per se in a winner-take-all competition) has little
power to discriminate among alternative interconnection pricing schemes.
Opportunity costs and parity per se can be made to serve almost any master
because the ultimate results depend on additional assumptions and constraints,
at times not always apparent even to insiders to the debate.
If this is true, how could proponents promise that opportunity cost pricing
based on the parity principle would produce unambiguous answers? The Privy
Council was unaware of implicit complementary rules imposed on the New
Zealand variant of parity per se. These implicit rules included: (1) the assumed
overwhelming importance of static economic efficiency and the assumed
relative unimportance of dynamic efficiency, (2) the need to apply the rule only
to the retail price not purged of monopoly profits, excess costs or cross
subsidies, (3) the assumption that incumbents, but not entrants, should be
guaranteed the revenues necessary to achieve revenue adequacy,177 and (4)
176. To list just a few of these emerging principles, we have the parity principle (1)
supplemented by a "complementary rule" that the monopolist be unconstrained as to the retail price
it may charge (which we label parity per se), (2) supplemented by the assertion that it should only
be calculated using the monopolist's retail price unconstrained by regulation and incorporating
any regulatory cross subsidies and monopoly profits (the New Zealand variant), (3) supplemented
by the requirement that the end-use prices to customers are purged of cross subsidies and
monopoly rents (the variant proposed more recently by its proponents for the U.S.
telecommunications industry), (4) supplemented by the assumption that it would be voluntarily
adopted by the monopolist (the variant proposed for the U.S. rail industry), (5) supplemented by
the requirement that it not permit appropriation of entrant's sunk costs and efficiency gains and
permit equally efficient competitors an equal opportunity to recover total costs (our proposals for
strong neutrality below), etc.
177. The rationale behind the parity principle that the monopolist's revenues are the
paramount consideration has a long history in these debates. For example, Baumol and Willig
argue:
[A]dequacy of revenues is the fundamental and over-riding necessary condition for
economic efficiency. . . . So long as market demands do not absolutely preclude
adequate revenues (as will be true where an industry becomes totally obsolete), it
is appropriate to do anything which achieves adequate revenues as quickly as
possible and which in the meantime approaches that state as closely as cost and
market conditions permit.
William J. Baumol & Robert D. Willig, Pricing Issues in the Deregulation of Railroad Rates, in
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF REGULATED MARKETS 11, 26 (Jorg Finsinger ed., 1983) (emphasis
added).
Recall our discussion of circumstances in regulated industries where concern over erosion
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the requirement for weak competitive neutrality in a competitive market is
winner-take-all. All these implicit assumptions necessary to produce
unambiguous answers were lost in the shuffle of litigation and ultimately
overlooked by the Privy Council.
C. Emerging Consensus
William J. Baumol and J. Gregory Sidak made numerous claims for the
parity principle, among which we find:
1. "[T]he rule is entirely familiar to economists, and its logic
will be virtually self-evident to them. .. .178
2. "[T]he result is valid always, not only when the pertinent
numbers happen in reality to match those in our
illustration. "179
3. "[T]he efficient component-pricing rule... is simply another
use of the incremental-cost principles that achieve economic
efficiency." 8 o
4. "[R]eaders will lose little in following the logic in the
remainder of our discussion if they treat average-incremental
cost and average-variable cost as synonymous."181
5. "In a competitive market, an incumbent will levy on a new
entrant an access charge that will cover both the direct
incremental cost of providing the access and its opportunity
cost. "182
Professors Baumol and Willig also claim universal applicability and widespread
agreement among experts as to the economic principles and pricing rules they
enunciated." 3 More recently, Baumol, Ordover, and Willig purport to show
of the incumbent's profits should be considered. But even that consideration holds only as a
temporary measure that is part of a transition to deregulation, to protect captive customers from
cost shifting, or to uphold a regulatory bargain. New Zealand is not one of these exceptions. It
is now more than three years since the trial. Since that time, despite facing competition in its most
profitable services, national and long distance calls, Telecom's profitability has grown rather than
been eroded. See August 1995 Report, supra note 141, app. G. There appears to be no evidence
that Telecom's profit would be so eroded that it could not provide for the future funding of its
business, or be justified in raising the price of the residential line rentals.
178. Baumol & Willig, supra note 177, at 182.
179. Id. at 184.
180. Id. at 173.
181. Id. at 177.
182. Id. at 201.
183. Baumol and Willig write:
We will show that there does exist such an established foundation, whose pertinence
and defensibility seem beyond dispute, and which has in fact never to our knowledge
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that the parity principle is both necessary and sufficient for competition on
equal terms. I"
Claims that the economic reasoning offered to the Privy Council by
Professors Baumol and Willig in support of the parity principle is "beyond
dispute" and is "categorical and unambiguous" are not true."s5 Neither is it
true that "virtually all economists adopt" the parity principle as it was
articulated in New Zealand, 8 6 nor that "the competitive market standard
yields unambiguous answers to the questions at issue here." Nor is it a "well-
known economic principle that efficiency requires" the parity principle as it
was proposed for New Zealand.
Despite the reasoning of the Privy Council, consensus on several points
has begun to emerge among the experts in the New Zealand debate:
1. The problem of any alleged cross-subsidy to residential and
rural line services should be bifurcated from the pricing of
competitive access and dealt with on a competitively neutral
basis;
2. The parity principle assumes the existence of a regulated
monopoly whose end-user prices have already been purged
of monopoly profits;
3. Competition will not purge the price of access and the prices
to consumers of monopoly rents under the parity principle;
4. The incumbent monopolist and the entrant do not compete on
equal terms under the parity principle;
been disputed elsewhere in circumstances analogous to those at issue here.
Moreover, as we will see, these fundamental economic principles, which we will
describe next, rigorously yield answers that are categorical and unambiguous, cutting
the ground from pointless dispute.
Baumol & Willig, supra note 1, at 2 (emphasis added). Professors Baumol and Willig profess to
offer the Court "unambiguous answers" to these issues and state that the parity principle is a
.necessary condition for economic efficiency." Id. at 2, 27. They state that "the basic efficiency
result is... always true, not just if the pertinent numbers of reality happen to match those in our
illustration." Id. at 31 (emphasis added). Baumol and Willig label any price less than that called
for by the parity principle a "subsidy" or "an interfirm cross-subsidy" to the entrant. Id. at 34,
35.
184. Baumol et al., supra, note 12, at 11-13.
185. Baumol & Willig, supra note 1, at 2.
186. See, e.g., JEANS ARNBAK ET AL., EUROPEAN-AMERICAN CENTER FOR POLICY
ANALYSIS NETWORK INTERCONNECTION IN THE DOMAIN OF ONP: STUDY FOR DGXIII OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1994); Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer, Problems of Efficient
Component Pricing for Postal Service (1996) (working paper in progress, on file with the Yale
Journal on Regulation); Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, Access and Interconnection
Pricing: How Efficient is the 'Efficient Component Pricing Rule'?, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 557
(1995); Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, The Access Pricing Problem, (Mar. 1995) (unpublished





5. Incumbents controlling interconnection generally have no
incentive to adopt voluntarily the pricing rule called for by the
parity principle and will behave opportunistically if not
restrained;
6. Pricing access according to the parity principle as proposed
for New Zealand would inhibit incentives for efficiency and
innovation and threaten the dynamic benefits of competition;
and
7. In a wide range of circumstances, the price of access should
be below that called for by the parity principle as proposed
for New Zealand and be based on long-run incremental cost.
Some of the experts involved in the New Zealand litigation have not taken
clear positions on each of these issues. Rather, they are ordered in descending
degree of apparent agreement. Note that there is a fair degree of overlap
between these conclusions and the seven conclusions of the New Zealand
government report. These points of emerging consensus are diametrically
opposed to the reasoning of the Privy Council on many key properties of the
parity principle.
IV. An Alternative Vision for Pricing Interconnection
A. Conditions for a Competitively Neutral Competitive Access Pricing
Scheme
The above discussion of the parity principle supports two goals for
interconnection pricing:
1. It should allow all equally efficient competitors an equal
opportunity to earn their cost of capital, include compensation
to the incumbent for any legacies of regulation, and purge the
interconnection price of monopoly rents (if any);
2. It should achieve competition on equal terms in the
competitive sector of the market; ownership of the bottleneck
facility should be neither an advantage nor a disadvantage to
the incumbent insofar as competition in the contested area on
the basis of true efficiency differences is concerned.
The first of these goals is designed to assure that there is no asymmetry
in recovering total costs for equally efficient competitors. Included in this test
is the requirement that the incumbent be compensated for any true legacies of
regulation, such as the Kiwi Share Obligation. The access price should not
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include any monopoly rents to the incumbent. By the same token, it should not
be used to impose a price squeeze on the entrant.
The second degree of competitive neutrality is designed to assure that all
competitors are able to compete on the basis of true efficiency differences
going forward. As we have seen, this is a relatively permissive test because
static economic efficiency is a rather robust property of access schemes that
satisfy the first degree of competitive neutrality.
B. Application to New Zealand
The problem of determining an optimal interconnection policy for the
deregulated telecommunications industry in New Zealand lies beyond the scope
of section 36 of the New Zealand competition law. The government's policy
goals are presumably twofold: privatize and stimulate competition in order to
both increase efficiency and pass the benefits along to consumers. Use of the
parity principle as the standard for interconnection risks thwarting these goals.
To allow Telecom monopoly rents in the price of interconnection, or to
allow preferential treatment for its sunk and common costs, or to allow
Telecom scope for opportunistic behavior against entrants would forever
frustrate the goals of competition. The parity principle would expose the
industry to all these problems; it simply does not resolve the interconnection
problem. The parity principle is inappropriate because it mistakenly analogizes
an essential facility in the telecommunications industry to the bottleneck portion
of a railroad track. The essential facility is ubiquity of service to all
telecommunications customers. Ubiquity relies not upon a bottleneck, but on
a bridge linking the networks. Telecom and Clear each require access to the
other's network. The task of competition policy is to turn the existing
bottleneck into a bridge.
Our recommended solution to achieve both strong and weak competitive
neutrality involves a shift in focus. Instead of asking what net revenues the
incumbent does or might obtain from "its" customers, the interconnection
problem should focus on (a) the incremental costs of actually linking the two
networks, (b) an appropriate settlement regime to compensate each carrier for
the cost of calls originating in the other competitor's network, but terminating
in its own,"' (c) provisions to prevent opportunistic behavior by either party
once the networks are linked, and (d) determining the appropriate economic
distinction between a legitimate, independent network and a large PABX
customer to obviate concerns of free-ridership.






A procompetitive interconnection policy must incorporate the notion of
reciprocity. Reciprocity arises out of the need for interconnection to preserve
ubiquity. It involves the acknowledgment that both network owners have
rights. Unlike the parity principle, reciprocity does not assign the incumbent
ownership of customers. Hence, reciprocity does not involve charging
"opportunity cost" for lost customers. Rather, it requires that each network
compete on equal terms to maintain customers.
When a call originates on Telecom's network and ends on Clear's
network, the parity principle compensates Clear for the incremental cost that
Telecom avoids by not completing the call itself. When a call originates on
Clear's network, the parity principle hardly applies the reverse formula on
Clear's behalf. Rather, the parity principle views Clear's origination of the call
as a service performed on behalf of Telecom. Telecom is assigned the same
revenues it would have received by originating the call itself, minus the
incremental cost it avoids by having Clear perform the service. Hence, the
parity principle hypothesizes Telecom's incremental revenues and cost for all
services on the originating end of the call.
In contrast, reciprocity would apply the same method of compensation
whether it was Clear or Telecom terminating a call on behalf of the other
network. Each network is compensated on the same cost basis. This approach
excludes opportunity costs and avoids hypothesizing that someone else might
have originated the call. Under reciprocity, the originating network can retain
the benefit of attracting the customer through a combination of competitive
price and service. Instead of assigning Telecom property rights over a
customer, reciprocity respects the network that the customer chooses to join.
For reciprocity to work economically, the charges for terminating calls must
reflect the correct valuation of scarce resources. An incorrect valuation will
lead to excessive use of scarce resources or distorted levels of investment in
services. As explained below, our proposal would involve reciprocal charges
of long-run incremental cost for terminating calls.
The economic rationale for reciprocal charges of long-run incremental
cost can be illustrated by imagining that Telecom were the sole provider of
services, but decided to split the network among independent subsidiaries that
would transact with each other. What would be the appropriate transfer price
for network use for these subsidiaries?' Telecom would have the
188. Chris Pattas, Appropriate Interconnection and Access Arrangements 3 (Apr. 10-12,
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation) (presented at ITS
Workshop, Wellington, New Zealand) (noting that pricing interconnection at long-run incremental
cost was based on the idea that it was the price that "a carrier with significant market power could
negotiate for itself if a genuinely competitive industry was the norm in telecommunications"); see
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subsidiaries pay each other, and hence would "charge" itself, only the
incremental cost of network transactions. It would not be efficient to carve up
the network and force each subsidiary to charge the other "opportunity costs"
for lost revenues. Economists agree that the efficient intercorporate transfer
price does not include foregone profit among subsidiaries. 8 9 In fact, one of
the frequent justifications for vertical mergers is that, by centralizing
ownership, "opportunity costs" as defined here will cease to be charged
between successive links in the chain of production. 9 Thus "opportunity
cost" does not form part of the concept of reciprocity.
Reciprocity also suggests that network carriers should cooperate to ensure
that the joint value of the networks is maximized for the customers.
Competition is often thought of in terms of an "invisible hand"; individuals
make self-interested decisions, yet the overall outcome is good for society.
However, self-interested decisions that do not adequately account for negative
impacts on customers or on the integrated network do not yield optimal results
for society. Cooperation is necessary, for example, in the design of network
components to establish compatibility and efficiency along all points of the
network. A similar requirement has arisen in other network industries where
consumers demand ubiquity, such as credit cards and automatic teller machines
("ATMs"). In the credit card industry, for example, the VISA network has
established a framework of rules for the cooperation and connection of over
five thousand independent credit card issuers. ATM networks also provide for
the cooperation and connection of independent banks. Without advocating a
return to regulation, we agree that the principle of cooperation should be a
component of reciprocity."'
D. Rationale for the Duration and Scope of Necessary Intervention in the
Transition to Competition
The following question has arisen in the telecommunications policy
debate: Why does Clear require a kick-start from the government in order to
also Jerry A. Hausman, Proliferation of Networks in Telecommunications 21 (Mar. 1994)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (stating that "[t]o
increase economic efficiency, regulators should lower access prices toward their incremental
cost"). The essential rationale is that prices in excess of incremental cost encourage inefficient
production decisions. In the present case, presumably the concern is uneconomic bypass.
189. See generally F.M. SCHERER & DANIEL Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURES
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 522-23 (1990).
190. See Martin K. Perry, Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects, in HANDBOOK
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 183, 243 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
191. Professor Willig has recently stated the need for cooperation in testimony for AT&T
of Illinois: "Since the incentives of the parties to cooperate need not square with social efficiency,
there is likely to be a productive role for a regulatory mandate that the LEC cooperate." Willig




successfully compete with Telecom? We do not view our interconnection
pricing proposal as a "kick-start," if that term is equated to a subsidy. Pricing
interconnection at incremental cost is not an infant industry argument. Our
recommended policy can only be viewed as a "kick-start" in the sense that it
attempts to get out of the current monopoly equilibrium in New Zealand and
into a new competitive equilibrium.
Economies and markets are dynamic systems. These dynamic systems
often have what economists call multiple equilibria. Multiple equilibria are
stable but disjointed outcomes; once the economy or market arrives at one of
the equilibria, natural forces will keep it there. Stability of the economic
system, however, does not imply optimality. Some equilibria will be superior
to others in terms of dynamic and static efficiency and the level of welfare they
provide. Because of inertia, some type of intervention is required to move the
market or economy from a sub-optimal equilibrium to a more optimal one.192
Once the system is given a sufficient push toward a more optimal equilibrium,
dynamic forces 93 will maintain the new equilibrium as long as it is stable.
The New Zealand telecommunications industry can be characterized in
this manner. Monopoly control of the local exchange market is, in effect, a
stable equilibrium. Because of pre-existing institutional arrangements, Telecom
can foreclose potential competitors. At the very least, Telecom can always
require indemnification for interconnection with potential entrants.
Furthermore, the strength of incumbency in conjunction with ownership of
bottleneck facilities means that Telecom will never allow an entrant to acquire
the market share the entrant would need to achieve reciprocity in negotiations.
Full competition in the local loop will never occur as long as Telecom is
allowed to apply the parity principle in setting interconnection terms.
As the competitive equilibrium is superior to the current monopoly
equilibrium in terms of static and dynamic efficiency,194 the issue is how to
arrive at a stable competitive equilibrium in the telecommunications industry
in New Zealand. More specifically, what sort of push does the industry
require? The role of government intervention at this stage is very specific: to
promote the types of contracts that would have been in place had the industry
192. The phenomenon of stable but sub-optimal equilibria has been used to describe why
some under-developed countries have a difficult time making a successful transition to
industrialization. A successful transition to industrialization may require achieving some initial
threshold of industrialization. Coordination failures among players in the market may prevent the
economy from reaching the needed threshold. See Kevin M. Murphy et al., Industrialization and
the Big Push, 97 J. PoL. ECON. 1003 (1989).
193. The dynamic forces can be laws, long-term contracts, institutional arrangements, or
the expectations of market players.
194. See ITS Paper, supra note t, app. A.
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already been competitive.' 9' This role will enable the development of the
institutional arrangements, the long-term contracts, and the market expectations
that are consistent with competition. In this sense, the industry will receive a
kick-start toward competition. Thus the pricing mechanisms that we suggest
are consistent with the types of contracts one would find in a competitive
telecommunications industry.
With such a specific government role, creeping intervention is easy to
avoid. As long as the interconnection pricing principles are clear and
opportunism is prevented, competition will sustain itself. As competition
develops, the market should reach a stage where all players need each other.
Bargaining power will be more balanced and the mutual dependence of the
players will encourage reciprocity. Maximizing the total benefits of the
network will come closer in line with the individual interests of all players.
As the marketplace works, the regulatory mechanisms can wither away.'96
E. Preventing Opportunistic Behavior
A procompetitive interconnection policy should strive to prevent
opportunistic behavior by either party. While constant and formal supervision
of the parties can prevent opportunistic behavior, it must be limited lest the
government be drawn back into the role of comprehensive regulator.
Opportunistic behavior can be prevented at minimum cost if the government
declares in advance clear standards of permissible behavior. Within this
framework, binding arbitration will be necessary for enforcement. We suggest
that the following points be kept in mind:
1. Acceptable contracting rules should be established. As
explained above, much of our concern with the parity
principle and the voluntary negotiations approach is the
potential for opportunistic behavior. This behavior is
sometimes evidenced by attempts to break contracts.
However, it can also govern the renewal of contracts. It may
not be efficient to sign perpetual contracts between the
parties. At the same time, no company should be exposed to
the possibility of a price squeeze simply because an expiration
date has arrived and no constraints govern until a new
195. See WILLIAM B. TYE, THE TRANSITION To DEREGULATION: DEVELOPING ECONOMIC
STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC POLICIES 10 (1991).
196. Perhaps mechanisms such as those of the Staggers Rail Act in the United States could
make this process automatic. Under the Act, contracts replaced regulations and courts replaced
regulators as parties exercised their rights in the transition. See generally Staggers Rail Act of




agreement is signed on terms dictated by the strongest party.
2. The ability of either party to manipulate data should be
minimized. The parties must be obligated to compile loop cost
data according to stipulated accounting procedures. Otherwise,
it may be very difficult for the parties to cooperate;
telecommunications companies have an inherent reluctance to
share data. Because it can be extremely difficult to verify or
critique cost data presented in an aggregate form, efforts
should be made to provide data in the least aggregate form
practical.
Professor Willig's recent testimony on behalf of AT&T supports a
requirement to disaggregate the basic network elements. Otherwise, two types
of opportunism may arise. The first, mentioned above, is obscuring actual
costs. The second, discussed by Professor Willig, is the ability to force
payment for services not truly exchanged among the parties. 97 The forced
purchase of undesired inputs through the practice of bundling may be socially
inefficient. Undesired elements from the bundle are effectively discarded, yet
their cost is passed along to the consumer.
F. Free-rider Concerns
An interconnection policy should prevent free-ridership. If any residential
user could obtain network status for the home, there would be the inevitable
temptation for everyone to abandon the network, pay the interconnection price
and leave Telecom stuck absorbing all its sunk costs. However, Clear is not
an ordinary customer seeking access; an ordinary customer does not have the
capability to terminate calls and does not come equipped with network
facilities. By focusing on relevant differences it is possible to address free-
ridership concerns and to discern which principles should apply when an entity
seeks access.
Defining a network appropriately would both prevent free-ridership and
further document the foundation for reciprocal treatment of Clear and all other
legitimate network competitors. Telecom's refusal to recognize Clear as a
network significantly contributed to the impasse between the parties. Telecom
incorrectly compared Clear to a large commercial PABX customer. 9 ' This
197. Willig Testimony, supra note 32, at 13-14.
198. For example, a Telecom press release characterized a proposal to Clear thus:
Under the long-term proposal Clear will pay Telecom a fixed annual per-line charge
to cover on-going fixed and common costs, including a Kiwi Share cost contribution,
called the Network Cost Share. This has been set at less than half the price other
businesses pay for access to Telecom's network.
TELECOM COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, LTD., TELECOM OFFERS CLEAR COST-BASED LOCAL
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comparison allowed Telecom to argue that Clear sought a free ride on
Telecom's sizeable network investments.
Although the proper definition of a network may be a complex technical
issue, the considerable distinctions between Clear and a PABX customer with
respect to technology and capacity were apparent to Judge Ellis and Professor
M. Brunt in the High Court. The Court recognized Clear's large call carrying
capacity relative to a PABX customer. 9 9 The Court also recognized that a
PABX is restricted to a specific site while Clear's technology is not.2'
Finally, in contrast to a PABX customer, the Court recognized that Clear will
use its own set of lines, switches and trunks in providing local service. Clear
also proposes to interconnect with Telecom's network trunkside.
For practical purposes, Clear therefore bears no resemblance to a PABX
customer. Judge Gault appears to have agreed that this distinction was
important to the free-ridership issue: "I was unimpressed with the 'floodgates'
argument that other private exchange operators might seek the same terms.
There should be little difficulty in differentiating them from an existing
operator with the toll market share Clear already has and with the resources
and intentions already demonstrated." 20' Any potential entrant may meet the
definition of a network and still operate on a significantly smaller scale than
Telecom; difference in scale does not mean free-ridership. When the entering
network is relatively small, Telecom may be concerned that the exchange of
calls between networks might not be reciprocal. Telecom, for example, may
claim its network assets are used more extensively by calls originating from
Clear's network, whether use be measured by one or a variety of cost drivers.
If so, Telecom should be able to measure any disparate use. There is no reason
why an imbalance of use cannot be measured separately and handled through
special provisions for compensation between the parties. Any concern with
free-ridership can thereby be avoided entirely. In sum, there exists no tension
between free-ridership and reciprocity or the other terms of a procompetitive
interconnection policy. Free-ridership concerns can be identified and addressed
independently.
SERVICE TERMS 1 (Feb. 9, 1995) (emphasis added) (on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
199. Telecom Corp. ofN.Z.v. Clear Communications, Ltd., [1992] 5 T.C.L.R. 166, 176
(H.C.), rev'd, [1993] 4 N.Z.B.L.C. 340 (C.A.), rev'd, [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385 (P.C.).
200. Id.
201. Telecom, [1993] 4 N.Z.B.L.C. at 365 (Gault, J., concurring).
Vol. 13:419, 1996
New Zealand Telecommunications
G. The Price of Interconnection
The parity principle would call for an evaluation of the profit that
Telecom might or might not make if it offered the same technology and service
as Clear. We propose focusing instead on the actual costs of interconnection,
without reference to the "opportunities" of either carrier. The direct
incremental cost of linking the two networks is one component. The other
major component is the cost of handling calls that originate in one network but
terminate in the other. We propose to base this charge on incremental cost,
which should have a long-run focus including necessary investments. Applying
reciprocity to this principle, Clear and Telecom should each be compensated
for the incremental costs incurred as a result of terminating the calls of their
competitor. Other services that fundamentally resemble a call would also be
priced at incremental cost as long as the same basic network elements are used.
Long-run incremental cost is preferable to short run pricing measures because
it allows for efficient investment in the equipment necessary to meet customer
demand. For example, the costs associated with future network expansion are
included in long-run incremental cost. Long-run incremental cost provides the
proper incentives for long-run investment within the industry.
The distinction between the parity principle and our proposal is
significant. The parity principle is a price squeeze limiting Clear's revenues
to Telecom's incremental cost of all the services Clear can provide in
competition with Telecom. Under our proposal, each carrier is allowed to price
originating calls in excess of incremental cost to its consumers and receive a
contribution to common costs.
We believe this proposal has several advantages over the parity principle.
First, it is easier to implement because cost estimates are used only for the
terminating portion of calls. There is no need to hypothesize Telecom's
incremental costs for every single service Clear may choose to offer its
customers.
Second, our proposal allows each carrier to recover a contribution to its
fixed and common costs. By applying the parity principle to every service an
entrant could offer, the entrant is condemned to insolvency. Our proposal,
however, allows each network operator to recover sunk and common costs.
Each network is free to price to consumers as it chooses. Pricing in excess of
incremental cost to the consumer while paying only incremental cost for
terminating calls is compatible with full cost recovery.
Third, our proposal is consistent with both efficiency and reciprocity. As
explained in our discussion of reciprocity, a firm would not have its wholly-
owned subsidiaries charge opportunity cost or a markup for either common
or sunk costs among themselves.
Finally, our proposal accommodates imbalances in the use of each
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network to terminate calls originating on the other. The parties can measure
the imbalance on a periodic basis and compensate the network that is used
more extensively.2 2
H. The "Infant Industry" or "Helping Hand" Argument
Proponents of the parity principle often disparage alternatives as variants
of the "infant industry" argument or the extension of a "helping hand."203
And it is in fact true that some observers have called for low access prices as
a means of offsetting barriers to entry and other impediments to effective
competition." 4 Undoubtedly, those calls are based in part on the authors'
views about the effectiveness of competition in the United Kingdom.2"5
However, our proposal is not designed to provide a second-mover
advantage in the price of access to offset some perceived market imperfection
or cost disadvantage of entrants. Rather, our proposals are designed to purge
the price of access of the first-mover advantage which is an inherent feature
of the parity principle. And, as we have shown above, it is simply not true that
pricing access at competitive levels will make available an "interfirm cross-
subsidy "2"6 to subsidize uneconomic entry by inefficient rivals.
I. Access Pricing At Ramsey Pricing Levels
We address only briefly alternatives to pricing access at levels dictated
by Ramsey pricing." We reject Ramsey pricing for New Zealand for two
reasons. The first is practical. The theory is unworkable in practice and there
is scant evidence that applying the theory is worth the trouble.20 ' The second
202. Note that in a situation of symmetry of costs and no significant call imbalance, a "bill
and keep" approach might be reasonable. Apparently, this thinking is responsible for situations
where two telephone systems within a metropolitan area provide free interconnection services
reciprocally.
203. Kahn, supra note 26, at 12, 15.
204. See, e.g., JOHN VICKERS & GEORGE YARROW, PRIVATIZATION: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1988).
205. Kyle Pope, Britain to Scrap a Pricing System Imposed on BT, WALL ST. J., July 26,
1995, at B6; Kyle Pope, Utility Privatizations Backfire in the U.K.: High Profits, Salaries May
Bring Regulatory Changes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1995, at A10.
206. Baumol & Willig, supra note 1, at 35.
207. Ramsey pricing is referred to as "charging what the market will bear" in the
vernacular or pricing to maximize aggregate "consumer surplus" in the view of those economists
who support it. See BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 132-36 (1988).
208. See William B. Tye & H. Leonard, On the Problems of Applying Ramsey Pricing
to the Railroad Industry with Uncertain Demand Elasticities, 17 TRANSP. RES. F. 439 (1983).
Empirical studies have shown that the gains from correct Ramsey pricing are small, even
assuming all the necessary assumptions are satisfied. Bonbright, Danielsen, and Kamerschen note
that:
[One study] simulated interstate telecommunications Ramsey prices and found
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is conceptual. Ramsey pricing calls for the incumbent to make maximum use
of its monopoly power, since it is the most likely source of the difference in
demand elasticities that the theory seeks to employ. It could merely be a back
door means of reintroducing the opportunity cost approach.
J. The Issue of a "Markup" Over Long-Run Incremental Cost
In the debate on pricing access, some have argued for a markup over
incremental cost. We propose that charges be based on long-run incremental
cost with no markup. However, depending on one's definition of incremental
cost, our proposal can be viewed as already containing a markup; i.e. long-run
incremental cost is equal to the short-run incremental cost of the service plus
a markup covering the forward-looking joint and common costs of
appropriately defined network elements. However, if incremental cost is
defined as the long-run average incremental cost of an entire service, the
rationale for charging even higher prices is not compelling. We acknowledge
that such a markup may be justified where there is a true asymmetry in the
cost structures of the carriers that could create an artificial competitive
advantage or disadvantage among the carriers if ignored. One such asymmetry
might be a universal service obligation imposed only on one party without
avenues for relief.
The argument for a markup may also be justified in the case of a non-
network entity seeking access to the network of a fully integrated carrier. If
the non-network entity does not offer reciprocal network services, then the
granting of access by the incumbent is unilateral and the bottleneck facilities
would not become a bridge between independent networks. Pricing access at
incremental cost could then give a competitive advantage to the entrant and
violate the standards of many economists for appropriate Ramsey pricing.2
that they produced relatively modest or small efficiency gains (frequently 2-3 percent
of revenue and [always] less than 7 percent) compared with the typical regulatory
use of fully distributed cost.
BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 207, at 541-42 (citing Brown & Sibley (1986)). Sylvester Damus
writes that: "The principal conclusion is that the contribution of Ramsey pricing to economic
efficiency is small compared to that of an alternative constraint on the level of railway profits."
The value of Ramsey pricing can be exaggerated .... The benefit from Ramsey pricing at a less
than profit-maximizing level can be very small. Sylvester Damus, An Evaluation of Ramsey
Pricing: Argentine Railways CA. 1905, 24 TRANSP. REs. F. 418, 418, 426 (1983).
209. The need for a markup depends importantly on exactly how the incremental costs
are calculated. See Pricing Market Access, supra note 46; Jean-Jacques Laffont, Access Pricing
and Competition, 38 EUR. ECON. REv. 1673 (1994); Jean-Jacques Laffont &Jean Tirole, Creating
Competition Through Interconnection: Theory and Practice (Dec. 30, 1994) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation). Laffont & Tirole comment that:
[I]t is widely accepted that marginal cost pricing of access deprives the dominant
telephone operator from the recovery of the fixed costs of the network and the
deficit stemming from the universal service constraints. Many regulators and
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However, when two certified networks interconnect and charge each other true
long-run incremental costs, a markup is not necessary to economic viability.
K. Asymmetries in Incremental Costs
The discussion so far assumes the carriers could terminate calls at equal
cost. However, the incremental costs for terminating calls may differ among
carriers. The degree to which these differences ought to be taken into account
depends on the cause of the differences. If the difference results from a
carrier's inefficiency, the difference ought not be taken into account. If the
cause is a true cost burden, then acknowledging the asymmetry in a settlement
regime is consistent with the principles we have recommended.
However, it makes no sense to argue that the incremental costs of inter-
network calls depend on the relative size of the networks.10 If this logic
were true, telecommunications networks would operate under diseconomies
of scale of massive proportions. It would cost, say, 100 times as much to
terminate a New Zealand call in the United States network as to terminate a
call in New Zealand. Furthermore, telecommunications costs are heavily driven
by switching costs, which are not proportionate to network size. Nevertheless,
these issues will have to be resolved on a case by case basis.
L. Pricing of End-User Services
We have seen that the parity principle starts with a presumption that the
price of the final service to the end user is optimal and establishes an access
price which achieves static economic efficiency by preventing uneconomic
bypass. The rule's failures in practice are blamed on poor regulation of the
final price, not the access rules.
economists have suggested long run incremental cost plus a markup as a workable
alternative to allow recovery of the "access" deficit.
Laffont & Tirole, supra, at 2.
210. Telecom announced that:
Telecom is offering to pay Clear for use of its network (i.e. reciprocity) although
there are not the "equal" payments Clear seeks because of course Telecom's network
is so much larger and more comprehensive than Clear's and thus has greater costs.
.. Telecom's and Clear's circumstances are not equal. Clear's local network
is neither likely to be of comparable size to Telecom's in the foreseeable future nor
does Clear have the regulatory impost of the Kiwi Share obligation. The first point
can be well illustrated by considering the size of Auckland, Wellington and
Christchurch Central Business Districts which comprise only 0.16%, 0.16% and
0.19% [footnote omitted] of the geographical area of their respective local call areas.
While Clear is only operating in those there Central Business Districts, it follows
that for local call between our networks, Telecom is doing most of the work and
incurring most of the cost.




We begin with the opposite presumption. We assume a commitment to
effective competition in providing services to end-users. The entire purpose
of the exercise is to undercut the existing monopoly of the incumbent by
providing access at competitive prices to achieve competition on equal terms
for service to the final customer. If the effort is successful, competition, not
monopoly, will determine prices to end-users."' We have shown that
concerns over uneconomic bypass are resolved by effective competition in the
contested area, regardless of the access price. We believe that this procedure
is consonant with New Zealand's strong preference not to regulate end-user
rates. For these reasons, we have not dwelled on the characteristics of rates
for end-users.
Nevertheless, some regime of price controls may be necessary as a
transition device only. Under these rules, the dominant carrier is not allowed
to charge customers a price below the sum of (1) the access price charged to
competitors plus (2) the dominant firm's incremental cost of the competitive
service.
Finally, the issue of pricing access cannot be divorced completely from
the issue of beliefs about the optimality of end-user prices. Decisions to drive
access prices downwards towards incremental costs will increase pressures on
carriers to recover costs through basic monthly charges to customers and tolls
on usage. By the same token, high markups over incremental costs could be
used to fund the KSO, should it be demonstrated to be a burden. More
economically appropriate access charges are likely to encourage competition
and thus achieve lower end-user prices.
V. Conclusion
As summarized in Figure 6, the parity principle does not solve the
interconnection problem for New Zealand's telecommunications. It fails to
achieve the New Zealand government's goals of increased competition and
211. Our proposals thus are similar to those advanced by Elizabeth Bailey and William
J. Baumol:
What, then, can be done to weaken the barrier to entry that is found when
entry requires heavy sunk investments?
• . . In these cases, regulators are just beginning to experiment with new
methods to ensure that no excessive profits are earned from sunk-cost facilities.
Rather than relying exclusively on traditional rate and entry regulation, they have
turned to two rather novel approaches. The first of these entails government
intervention to ensure equal access to the sunk facility. If the facility is privately
owned, the government requires that all firms seeking to use the facility be given
access to it, that the access price be reasonable, and that all users be charged the
same price. If the sunk facility is in the hands of a local public authority, then that
authority is encouraged not to discriminate among private users in its access policies.
Elizabeth Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets, 1
YALE J. ON REG. 111, 124 (1984) (citation omitted).
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consequent benefits to consumers. The concept of opportunity costs, a critical
feature of the parity principle, poses the threat of becoming a generalized fudge
factor for setting the price of interconnection. Opportunity cost has become
an increasingly elastic concept that permits the inclusion of a variety of
justifiable and unjustifiable factors into the price of interconnection, even
including monopoly profits and potential future price increases to the final
customer. Contrary to the arguments made by its proponents in the New
Zealand litigation, competition will not purge the access price of monopoly
rents under the parity principle. Nevertheless, the problems with the parity
principle go well beyond the monopoly rents issue. Proponents claim static
efficiency properties for the theory in the contested area, even where it would
guarantee recovery of monopoly profits. This fallacy rests upon an easily
resolved confusion that involves an imaginary conflict among competitive
prices, incentives for entry, and static economic efficiency. The rule was
developed for regulated industries and simply does not apply to a deregulated,
competitive environment. The incumbent monopolist and entrant do not
compete on a level playing field under the rule, because it condemns the
entrant to inadequate recovery of its sunk and common costs. The rule
threatens to impede technological progress by constraining the entrant to
indemnify incumbents for all sunk costs of obsolete technology and by creating
a mechanism whereby incumbents can appropriate the efficiency gains and
benefits of innovation by entrants. Furthermore, the parity principle is inspired
by the belief that voluntary negotiations can yield efficient prices. In reality,
voluntary negotiations open the door to opportunistic behavior by the
incumbent. Any one of these several problems with the rule can make entry
unattractive for an efficient firm. Combined, they counsel for abandoning the
rule entirely. The parity principle is simply inappropriate for the
telecommunications industry in New Zealand.
We urge an alternative pricing approach for the interconnection of
telecommunications networks in New Zealand. Our approach defines the
interconnection problem as one of achieving competition on equal terms in the
final market for service to telecommunications customers, not one of merely
achieving static efficiency in the supply of a component to a monopolist who
is deemed to choose the services of competitors via a make or buy decision.
Thus, we begin by recognizing the ubiquity of access demanded by consumers
of telecommunications services. This demand means that independent networks
must connect on the basis of reciprocity, must cooperate to maximize the joint
value of the network to the customer, and must compete on equal terms.
Further, we recognize that the reliance of each network on the other will create
the potential for opportunistic behavior once they are linked. The optimal
interconnection policy should seek to protect each party from the possibility
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established to handle the termination of calls that flow from one network to
the other. We propose that the price for terminating calls be based on long-run
incremental costs.
